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Kosovo is like so many post-conflict societies.  Having survived a 
devastating war, the region found itself home to a new cadre of 
leaders intent on re-establishing order.  In the name of peace and 
security, these new leaders used the state of turmoil of the post-war 
environment to centralize their powers.  In efforts to normalize 
society, they rounded up those suspected of ethnic hate crimes and 
placed them in indefinite detention.  Despite the expiration of 
detention orders and judicial condemnations of such devices, 
detainees languished in prison while those in power continued to 
proclaim their commitment to human rights standards from the 
perspective of state immunity.  While the scene may be reminiscent of 
the ascent of warlords and rebel fighters into power, there is one 
striking difference in Kosovo.  These leaders were not warlords or 
rebel fighters; they were representatives of the United Nations 
(“U.N.”).  With no systems in place to check the U.N.’s behavior, the 
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harbinger of human rights had now become its leading defaulter:  
immune and unaccountable.  
INTRODUCTION 
As the example of Kosovo illustrates, questions of U.N. 
accountability have arisen1 as the U.N. takes a leading role in 
response to international crises.2  Since its inception, the U.N. has 
engaged in more than fifty peace-keeping operations3 and thirteen 
peace-building missions.4  To permit the U.N. to function quickly and 
efficiently in politically unstable environments, the Security Council 
                                                          
 1. See Fredrick Rawski, To Waive or Not To Waive:  Immunity and Accountability in 
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103, 125 (2002); see also Carla 
Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity:  Applying International Human Rights Law to the United 
Nations in East Timor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 676-77 (2002); David 
Marshall & Shelley Inglis, The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice in the 
United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 95 (2003); Ralph Wilde, 
Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor, 
7 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L & COMP. L. 455, 455 (2001). 
 2. See Laurence I. Rothstein, Note, Protecting the New World Order:  It is Time to 
Create a United Nations Army, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 112 (1993) 
(noting the growing need for U.N. peacekeeping intervention).  See generally David 
Bills, Note, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention:  The 
Ramifications of Reform on the United Nations’ Security Council, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 107, 
108-09 (1996) (arguing that the Security Council’s growing interest in addressing 
human rights abuses has meant increased U.N. involvement in international crises); 
Rajendra Ramlogan, Towards a New Vision of World Security:  The United Nations Security 
Council and the Lessons of Somalia, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 213, 258-59 (1993) (advocating 
that the U.N. take a preventive approach to pending international crises in order to 
avoid continued strains on its ability to effectively maintain peace). See also Yogesh K. 
Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 883, 898 
(1995) (arguing that the U.N. has responded to international humanitarian crises 
without adequate attention to its capacities as an organization). 
 3. See United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, Background Note:  June 18, 2003, U.N. Doc. DPI/1634/Rev.29 
(2003) (noting that since 1948 the U.N. has been involved in 56 operations, 
including 14 current operations costing $28.74 billion), available at 
http:/www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf (last visited September 3, 2003) (on file 
with the American University Law Review). 
 4. See United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations Political 
and Peace-Building Missions, Background Note:  June 15, 2003, U.N. Doc. 
DPI/2166/Rev.8 (2003) (indicating that nearly 400 international civilian personnel 
and over 600 local civilian personnel have been involved in the operations), available 
at http:/www.un.org/peace/ppbm.pdf (last visited September 3, 2003) (on file with 
the American University Law Review); see also International Peace Academy, 
Transitional Administrations, U.N. State Building Missions Since 1945 [hereinafter IPA, 
Transitional Administrations Chart] (listing the types of state functions assumed by 
the U.N. in its missions over the last half century), at 
http://www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseTransAdmin_Print.htm 
(last visited July 26, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).  The 
chart demonstrates that more recent missions have seen expanded U.N. authority 
into the executive, legislative and judicial branches.  Id.  In the case of the U.N.’s 
work in East Timor, the IPA notes that the interim administration even had treaty-
making powers.  Id.  
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has granted U.N. officials broad authority.5  In recent missions, 
regulations authorized legislative, executive and some judicial 
authority in U.N. actors,6 allowing these individuals to operate as the 
new state administrators.7 
At the same time that the U.N. and its agents have become state 
actors, they are not bound by the same human rights standards 
required of States.8  Although the U.N. has recently acknowledged 
the relevance of these standards in the administration of a territory,9 
                                                          
 5. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1272 (1999) [hereinafter U.N. Resolution 1272] (authorizing the United 
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”), the Mission in East 
Timor, to “take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate”). 
 6. See generally UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, On the Authority of the Interim 
Administration in Kosovo, § 2 (July 25, 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 1999/1] 
(stating “[a]ll legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including 
the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General”), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg01-99.htm (on file with the 
American University Law Review); U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5, at 2 
(establishing UNTAET,  “which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the 
administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and 
executive authority, including the administration of justice”). 
 7. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 632 (noting that in many situations the U.N. 
has undertaken partial or total sovereign powers in its missions in regions such as 
Namibia, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor).  See generally Sir 
Robert Jennings, Sovereignty and International Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND 
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 30-31 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002) (discussing the void 
filled by the U.N. in areas that lack governments with centralized power such as 
Bosnia and Kosovo). 
 8. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 644-47 (finding that in the past, the U.N. has 
claimed that it could not be formally bound by international humanitarian law 
because it could not consent to the conventions). Because it cannot consent, the 
U.N. required participating States to train the State’s incoming U.N. personnel.  Id.  
In 1993, the U.N. took over training its forces in humanitarian practices in Rwanda, 
but did not give a clear definition of what that entailed.  Id. at 646-47. 
 9. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, § 2 (providing that, “[i]n 
exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding public 
office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized human rights standards and shall 
not discriminate against any person on any ground such as sex, race, color, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, association with 
a national community, property, birth or other status”) (emphasis added); UNMIK 
Regulation 1999/24, On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, § 1.1 (Dec. 12, 1999)  
[hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 1999/24] (listing the internationally recognized 
human rights standards to which public officials acting in their official capacities 
would be beholden), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
regulations/1999/reg24-99.htm (on file with the American University Law Review); 
see also UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, On the Authority of the Transitional Administration 
in East Timor, § 2 (Nov. 27, 1999) [hereinafter UNTAET Regulation 1999/1] 
(providing more guidance than UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 by enumerating the 
applicable international standards in its resolution), available at 
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etreg1.htm (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  Section 2 of UNTAET Regulation 1999/1 provides that: 
[i]n exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or 
holding public office in East Timor shall observe internationally recognized 
human rights standards, as reflected, in particular, in: 
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traditional human rights conventions and treaties, to which States are 
beholden,10 are not legally enforceable on international 
organizations.11  Furthermore, U.N. regulations grant blanket 
privileges and immunities to actors within these organizations, 
making it unclear how, and by whom, international human rights 
standards will be enforced on U.N. personnel in humanitarian 
missions.12 
                                                          
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 10 December 1948; 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 
December 1966 and its Protocols; The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966; The 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 
21 December 1965; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women of 17 December 1979; The Convention 
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment of 17 December 1984; The International Convention on 
the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989. 
They shall not discriminate against any person on any ground such as sex, 
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic 
or social origin, association with a national community, property, birth or all 
other status. 
Id. 
 10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 301(2) (1987) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT] (explaining that “‘party’ means a State or international organization 
that has consented to be bound by the international agreement and for which the 
agreement is in force”).  States are only bound to international standards when they 
express consent to the convention or treaty.  Id.  However, even without their 
consent, States may be bound to international standards when these standards have 
reached the level of peremptory norms.  Id. § 102, cmt. k.  Some human rights 
principles have become universally accepted, such as the prohibition of genocide, 
war crimes, and aircraft hijackings.  Id. § 404. 
 11. Id.  For the purposes of this Comment, the term “international organizations” 
will refer to inter-governmental organizations unless otherwise specified. 
 12. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of 
KFOR and UNMIK and their Personnel in Kosovo (Aug. 18, 2000) [hereinafter UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/47] (granting U.N. personnel immunity when they are acting 
within their official capacity), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
regulations/2000/reg47-00.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).  
The Regulation grants broad immunity to members of KFOR and UNMIK that 
extends even after the expiration of the mission.  Id. § 5.  The Secretary-General, 
however, may waive immunity in any case, and the regulation does provide some 
remedies for third party liability.  Id. §§ 6-7.  Third party claims for “property loss or 
damage and for personal injury, illness or death, arising from or directly attributed 
to KFOR, UNMIK or their respective personnel and which do not arise from 
‘operative necessity’ of either international presence, shall be settled by Claims 
Commissions established by KFOR and UNMIK . . . .”  Id. § 7.  Compare id. §§ 2, 3 
(outlining the immunities of KFOR and UNMIK), with  U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 
(1999) [hereinafter U.N. Resolution 1244], at 11(j) (emphasizing the mission’s 
commitment to human rights) and UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, supra note 9, § 2 
(describing the international standards applicable to interim personnel).  It is 
unclear how the commitment to human rights comports with the grant of privileges 
and immunities in interim administrations and whether a viable claims commission 
has been established.  See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SECOND ANNUAL 
REPORT 2001–2002 2 (2002) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON ANNUAL REPORT 2002] 
(reporting a lack of public information regarding UNMIK and KFOR supported 
claims commissions designed to address human rights violations), available at 
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The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”) exemplifies the 
problems created when centralizing authority.13  As a consequence of 
the lack of adequate institutional checks in international missions,14 
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (“SRSG”) 
continued to unlawfully detain suspected criminals.15  UNMIK 
justified the use of this practice16 despite condemnation from human 
rights groups and the Kosovo judiciary.17  Beyond inequitable results 
                                                          
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/spec%20reps/Final%202%20Annual% 
20Report%202002%2010-07-2%20English.doc (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 13. See, e.g., Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Mission in 
Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Report 2-The Development of the 
Kosovo Judicial System:  June 10–Dec. 15, 1999 (Dec. 17, 1999) [hereinafter OSCE, 
LSMR 2] (recognizing that defendants in pre-trial custody waited for up to six 
months for judicial proceedings because of serious problems in the administration 
of, and the resources available to, the Kosovo judiciary), available at 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/report2.htm (on file with 
the American University Law Review). 
 14. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, THE 
CONFORMITY OF DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY UNDER ‘EXECUTIVE ORDERS’ WITH 
RECOGNISED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 8 (2001)  [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON, 
SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3] (recommending the creation of judicial panels composed, at 
least in part, of international judges who could review the SRSG’s conformity to 
human rights standards), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/ 
spec%20reps/pdf/sr3.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review); see also 
Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Benevolent Despotism:  A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East 
Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1101, 1107-08 (2001) (identifying tensions within 
the directives of the U.N. mandate for East Timor since the U.N. has a dual role of 
building institutional capacity while administering the region as a governorship).  
One task emphasizes distribution of responsibility while the other emphasizes 
centralization of authority.  Id. 
 15. See generally OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, supra note 14, at 5 
(reviewing the SRSG’s violation of international guidelines for detention); Press 
Release, Amnesty International, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Amnesty 
International Calls for an End to Executive Orders of Detention (Aug. 3, 2001) 
[hereinafter Amnesty, Executive Orders] (condemning SRSG Hans Haekkerup for 
violation of the rights of detainees under Article 5 of the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or “ECHR”), available 
at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700172001?open&of=ENG-2EU 
(on file with the American University Law Review).  The press release specifically 
stated that the executive orders violated the detainees’ rights because detainees were 
not notified about the reason for their arrest, did not have a chance to seek judicial 
review, could not challenge the legality of the action, and were not afforded a means 
to obtain compensation for unlawful detention.  Id. 
 16. See UNMIK Refutes Allegations of Judicial Bias and Lack of Strategy, UNMIK NEWS 
(Division of Public Information, UNMIK Pristina), June 25, 2001 [hereinafter 
UNMIK, Judicial Bias] (justifying U.N. use of measures such as executive detention 
because of the state of emergency recognized in Kosovo), at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/news/nl98.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 17. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Amnesty International Protests the 
Unlawful Detention of Afrim Zeqiri (Feb. 21, 2001)  [hereinafter Amnesty, Afrim 
Zeqiri] (criticizing the SRSG’s detention of a Kosovar Albanian after Executive 
Orders had expired), at http://www.amnesty.org (on file with the American 
University Law Review); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002:  EUROPE AND 
CENTRAL ASIA OVERVIEW (2002) (charging U.N. administrators with deviating from 
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for individuals, brazen executive revocation of institutional checks 
undermines the legitimacy of the U.N.’s work18 and erodes local 
incentive to comply with international human rights standards.19  For 
this and many other reasons,20 international organizations that 
assume responsibilities of States in tumultuous times should adopt 
and enforce international standards that are typically required of 
States.21 
This Comment will examine existing practices of, and problems 
with, international organizations taking on state functions.  It 
concludes that when the U.N. undertakes peace-keeping operations 
that include state functions, it should abide by the corresponding 
international human rights standards and institute measures for 
effective enforcement.  This Comment evaluates this problem 
through the example of the UNMIK SRSG’s use of Executive Orders 
for prolonged detention of suspected criminals.  To provide 
historical perspective, Part I will examine the role of the U.N. in 
interim administrations and the lack of applicable standards.  Part II 
                                                          
international human rights standards and due process in the name of security), 
available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 18. See generally Annemarie Devereux, Conference Paper Abstract, Searching for 
Clarity:  A Case-Study of UNTAET’s Application of International Human Rights Norms 
(advocating that U.N. missions adopt human rights reporting requirements and 
measures that ensure accountability in order to thwart threats to the U.N.’s 
commitment to human rights), at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/ 
PCconfabstracts/Devereux.doc (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 19. See Wilde, supra note 1, at 459-60 (describing the antagonism cultivated 
against the interim administration when international actors conduct their duties 
arbitrarily and are not held accountable); see also UNHCR/OSCE, Update on the 
Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Report 5, Feb.–May 2000, at 20 (May 31, 2000) 
(noting that the U.N. has an opportunity to be a model of human rights in its 
administration of Kosovo), at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/ 
minorities/minrep05eng.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 20. See Simon Chesterman, The United Nations as Government:  Accountability 
Mechanisms for Territories Under U.N. Administration (outlining three reasons for 
institutional checks on United Nations missions:  (1) to prevent the use of power in a 
dictatorial or fascist manner—or fascist governance; (2) to prevent the use of power 
in contradiction to human rights norms—or bad governance; and (3) to prevent the 
use of power in violation of the ideals which one would like to see such power used 
in the future administration of the region by local actors—or “do-as-I-say-not-as-I-do 
governance”), at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/ un_as_govt_for_web.pdf 
(last visited July 26, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).  These 
reasons will not be addressed in this Comment. 
 21. See generally Theodor Meron, Towards a Humanitarian Declaration on Internal 
Strife, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 859 (1984) (endorsing the application of humanitarian law to 
the internal conflict of States); John Cerone, Minding the Gap:  Outlining KFOR 
Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 469, 475-78 (2001) (noting that 
KFOR as a whole may be held to international human rights standards because its 
members are bound by the human rights obligations of their respective home 
States). 
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will discuss U.N. accountability.  This part first explains the rise of 
privileges and immunities and the response to abuses of these 
powers.  It then examines the legal basis for the expansion of U.N. 
functions and argues that because of this expansion, human rights 
law should apply to the U.N.  Part III traces the U.N.’s instrumental 
role in the development of human rights standards, particularly those 
relating to detentions, and discusses the absence of any binding effect 
of these documents on the U.N.  This part also provides arguments 
for the legal basis for applying human rights instruments.  Part IV will 
explore the administration of UNMIK as a case study on the abuse of 
human rights through centralized authority.  This part will also 
examine the methods the U.N. has employed to correct these abuses.  
Part V will discuss recommendations on how to incorporate checks 
on the administration of human rights standards in U.N. missions.  
Finally, Part VI will discuss the implications of applying human rights 
law to the U.N. 
I. THE HISTORY OF U.N. AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 
INVOLVEMENT IN INTERIM ADMINISTRATIONS 
A. The History of U.N. and International Organization Administration 
For more than a century, international organizations have been 
involved in interim territorial administrations22 without clear 
guidance on what international human rights standards they 
undertake when conducting affairs of States.23  The U.N.’s 
predecessor, the League of Nations, engaged in many forms of 
territorial administration.24  The League of Nations exercised 
governmental function in the Free City of Danzig25 and limited 
                                                          
 22. See Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond:  The Role of International 
Territorial Administration, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 583 (2001) (recounting that the U.N. 
and its predecessor, the League of Nations, have been involved in the administration 
of refugee camps, the operation of relief assistance programs and the conduct of 
government). 
 23. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.  For activities prior to the creation of 
the International Bill of Human Rights, states followed international human rights 
standards that were a result of custom.  Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 638. 
 24. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 583; see also M.S. RAJAN, THE EXPANDING 
JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 35-36 (1982) (reviewing questions of 
jurisdiction and sovereignty raised in the involvement of the U.N. and the League of 
Nations in the administration of non-self governing territories).  See generally R.C. 
Longworth, End of Sovereignty:  Nations’ Internal Affairs Now the World’s Business, CHI. 
TRIB., Sept. 19, 1993, at 1C (arguing that the U.N. has an inherent capacity to 
administer territories) (emphasis added). 
 25. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586 (noting this administration continued from 
1920-1939). 
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governmental functions in the German Saar Basin,26 the Columbian 
town and district of Leticia27 and in Lithuania.28  Following World War 
II, Member States29 also authorized the U.N. to use administrative 
powers over the Free Territory of Trieste, though the U.N. never 
actually assumed this role.30 
In the creation of the U.N., the drafters explicitly authorized the 
U.N.’s involvement in trusteeships,31 which began the Organization’s 
nearly fifty-year involvement in the administration of former 
colonies.32  Following its experience with trusteeships, the U.N. 
received authorization from the Security Council to begin a series of 
territorial administrations during the Cold War era.33  The U.N. 
administered Irian Jaya, or western Guinea, during the transition 
from Dutch to Indonesian control of the region.34  The U.N. also 
helped administer the Congo from 1960-1964.35  Although authorized 
to administer South West Africa, or Namibia, it did not because of 
South African protest.36 
                                                          
 26. Id. (noting League of Nations administration of the Saar between 1920 and 
1935). 
 27. Id. (noting League of Nations administration of Leticia from 1933-1934). 
 28. Id. (noting that the League of Nations appointed the president of the Upper 
Silesia Mixed Commission in 1922 and the chair of the Memel Harbor Board in 
Lithuania in 1924). 
 29. As used in this Comment, “Member States” refers to the Member States of 
the U.N.  A complete list of U.N. Member States is posted on the U.N. home page at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html. 
 30. Wilde, supra note 22, at 586 (discussing the 1947 U.N. authorization to 
exercise governmental powers in Trieste). 
 31. U.N. CHARTER ch. XII; see Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of 
Post-Conflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 76 (2001).  Based on the authority of Article 
77 of the U.N. Charter, the League of Nations trusteeship passed to the U.N.  Id. 
 32. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:  A COMMENTARY 1129 (Bruno 
Simma ed., 2002) (noting that the U.N. terminated its last trusteeship in 1994 but 
decided to suspend the Trusteeship Council activities rather than dissolve the 
institution); see also infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (describing ways in 
which the U.N. has been involved in territorial administration and trusteeships). 
 33. See generally RAJAN, supra note 24, at 201 (crediting the expansion of the 
U.N.’s jurisdiction also to the call from peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America for 
“international accountability for the welfare of colonial peoples”). 
 34. See Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), Aug. 15, 1962, 
Indon.-Neth., 437 U.N.T.S. 274 (establishing the administration of West New 
Guinea); see also Matheson, supra note 31, at 77 (noting that Indonesia and the 
Netherlands made an agreement in which they delegated to the U.N. interim control 
over western Guinea for a seven-month period during 1962-1963). 
 35. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586; see also RAJAN, supra note 24, at 159 (outlining 
the framework of an agreement between the Congo and the U.N. for the 
maintenance of peace and security in the region). 
 36. See G.A. Res. 2248, U.N. GAOR, 5th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
A/6657 (1967); see also Wilde, supra note 22, at 586; Matheson, supra note 31, at 77 
(noting that the U.N. had even set up a Council for Namibia to carry out the 
functions of governance).  But see IPA, Transitional Administrations Chart, supra note 
4 (listing a U.N. state-building mission in Namibia from 1989-1990 that worked 
primarily on elections). 
ABRAHAM.AUTHORCHANGES2FINAL.DOC 10/28/2003  2:07 PM 
1300 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:1291 
After the Cold War, international organizations, predominately the 
U.N., engaged in a second series of territorial administrations37 in 
response to regional conflicts.38  In 1991, the Security Council 
authorized the U.N. to administer Western Sahara39 and Cambodia40 
in an effort to promote regional stability.41  With the rise of the 
conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s, the European Union became 
involved in the administration of Mostar42 while the U.N. 
administered Bosnia and Herzegovina.43  At the conclusion of the 
Bosnian war with the Dayton process,44 the U.N. led the 
administration of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, or Eastern 
Slavonia, all of which are located in Croatia.45 
The most recent U.N. missions have raised questions of what 
obligations the U.N. assumes in the administration of territories.46  
Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) 
                                                          
 37. See Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 
301, 303-04 (1995) (arguing that the U.N.’s recent efforts at humanitarian 
intervention is the modern incarnation of the trusteeship).  See generally Thomas M. 
Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 601 (1990) (discussing the role of the U.N. after the Cold War). 
 38. See Edward C. Luck, Book Review, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 603, 603 (2000). 
 39. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586 (acknowledging the U.N. has not yet assumed 
its administrative role in Western Sahara).  See generally Yahia H. Zoubir, The Western 
Sahara Conflict:  A Case Study in Failure of Pre-negotiation and Prolongation of Conflict, 26 
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 173, 212-13 (1996) (describing the conflict in Western Sahara and 
U.N. involvement in peace negotiations). 
 40. See Carol Umhoefer, United Nations Towards a U.N.-Sponsored Cambodian 
Solution, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 275, 277 (1991) (noting increased U.N. involvement in 
Cambodia after peace negotiations failed). 
 41. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586. 
 42. See Eur. Comm’n Bulletin of the Eur. Union, Memorandum of Understanding on 
the European Union Administration of Mostar (June 10, 1994) (acknowledging that the 
E.U. would administer Mostar, not the U.N.), available at 
http://law.gonzaga.edu/library/ceedocs/bosnia/mostar94.htm (on file with the 
American University Law Review); Eur. Comm’n Bulletin of the Eur. Union, Former 
Yugoslavia (Feb. 14, 1996) (pledging the European Unions’ commitment to the 
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) on its Administration of Mostar), available 
at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9601/p104008.htm (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 43. See S.C. Res. 1035, SCOR 50th Sess., 3613 mtg. S/RES/1035 
(1995)(establishing U.N. administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina); see also S.C. 
Res. 1088, SCOR 51st Sess., 3723 mtg. S/RES/1088 (1996) (extending the mandate 
for U.N. administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina).  The mission terminated on 
Dec. 31, 2002.  For more information on the U.N. mission in Bosnia, visit the home 
page of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“UNMIBH”), at 
http://www.unmibh.org/index.asp. 
 44. See generally SUMANTRA BOSE, BOSNIA AFTER DAYTON:  NATIONALIST PARTITION 
AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 1-4 (2002) (criticizing the Dayton Peace 
Agreement that ended the Bosnian war and effectively divided the region into three 
states). 
 45. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586 (noting U.N. administration from 1996-98). 
 46. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing issues of U.N. 
accountability in interim administrations thus far raised in legal scholarship). 
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bombing of the disintegrating former Yugoslavia,47 the U.N. began 
administering Kosovo.48  Three months later, the U.N. also assumed 
the administration of East Timor under a similarly worded Security 
Council mandate.49  These recent missions were unique in that they 
included substantial civil administration, including the 
administration of justice and the rule of law, a role the U.N. 
undertook for the first time in such a holistic form.50  Until these later 
missions, detention issues had not arisen as a matter of human rights 
law for the U.N.51  Thus, while the present review of international 
organization involvement in territorial administration is by no means 
exhaustive, it highlights the breadth of U.N. and international 
organization involvement in territorial administration.  Although the 
U.N. has increasingly expanded its administrative powers in territorial 
administrations to include more than just executive authority,52 there 
has been little or no discussion of detentions until recent missions.53 
                                                          
 47. See U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12 (authorizing the interim 
administration in Kosovo). 
 48. See TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO:  WAR AND REVENGE (2000).  Following Slobodan 
Milosevic’s unwillingness to negotiate an agreement to curb the violations of human 
rights and the failure of Rambouillet talks, the United States led a campaign to end 
Serb aggression.  Id. at 197-226.  The events concluded with the passage of Security 
Council Resolution 1244, authorizing the U.N. administration of Kosovo.  Id. at 297. 
 49. See U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (authorizing the administration of 
East Timor). 
 50. See REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS:  THE QUIET REVOLUTION 866 (Joachim 
Muller ed., 2001) (noting that UNMIK was the first mission where the U.N. assumed 
almost complete administrative responsibilities of a state ranging from establishing 
customs to collecting garbage).  The author notes that prior to UNMIK and 
UNTAET, the U.N. had only engaged in “elements of civil administration.”  Id. at 
866.  See IPA, Transitional Administrations Chart, supra note 4 (cataloguing the types 
of powers the U.N. assumed in its state-building missions). 
 51. See Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International 
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, § 1.1 (1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 
1656, 1658 (1999) [hereinafter Bulletin] (outlining provisions for the treatment of 
civilians, combatants, and detainees in accordance with the Third Geneva 
Convention of 1949).  The Bulletin notes that provisions regarding U.N. observation 
of humanitarian law are applicable in situations of armed conflict or when peace-
keepers engage in use of force as self defense.  But see Peter Finn, U.S. Troops Seize 6 
Terror Suspects Freed by Bosnia, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at A16 (noting that issues of 
unlawful detention also arose in the context of international peace-keepers’ defiance 
of orders from a Bosnian court to release six individuals, five of whom had 
naturalized Bosnian citizenship).  U.S. officials arrested the men after the Bosnian 
government released them.  Id.  They were eventually transferred to detention 
facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  Id. 
 52. IPA, Transitional Administrations Chart, supra note 4. 
 53. See Bulletin, supra note 51, § 1.1 (outlining provisions for the treatment of 
detainees). 
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B. The Lack of Norms for Laws Applicable in Administration 
Although the U.N.’s role in territorial administration has been 
extensive, the legal standard it should observe in these situations is 
not as clear.54  The purposes listed in the U.N. Charter serve as an 
overarching standard55 but are only principles without binding 
authority.56  Since the U.N. typically intervenes in situations of gross 
violations of human rights, it often uses exigency as justification for 
deviation from human rights norms.57  As a result, the nature of the 
intervention usurps discussion on the standards by which the U.N. 
should abide.58  U.N. derogation from human rights is viewed as 
subsidiary to the atrocities committed by the existing government,59 
and media attention reinforces such a notion.60  Additionally, as 
“interim” signifies, the U.N. considers its presence temporary, so it 
places emphasis on intervention rather than accountability.61  In the 
rare instances where there are discussions of accountability, they are 
framed in terms of protecting international personnel.62 
                                                          
 54. See Devereux, supra note 18 (urging the U.N. to establish human rights 
monitoring and reporting systems and to increase its accountability in the field 
compatible with its privileges and immunities). 
 55. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (describing the purposes of the 
U.N.). 
 56. See N.D. WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 225 (1996) 
(noting that the language in the Preamble and Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter 
merely promotes “increased respect” for human rights).  But see Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 (entered into force Jan. 8, 1980) (“A treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
 57. See, e.g., UNMIK, Judicial Bias, supra note 16 (justifying the U.N.’s use of 
executive orders based on the continued state of emergency in Kosovo). 
 58. See id. (responding to accusations of violations of international human rights 
standards by stating that “Kosovo still ranks as an internationally-recognized 
emergency,” even though the mission at this point had been existent for nearly two 
years).  The article further noted that “international human rights standards accept 
the need for special measures that, in the wider interests of security, and under 
prescribed legal conditions, allow authorities to respond to the finding of 
intelligence that are not able to be presented to the court system.”  Id.  See generally 
KELLY-KATE S. PEASE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS:  PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNANCE 
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 212-16 (2d ed. 2000) (equating humanitarian 
intervention with a form of “dictatorial interference” with the affairs of a sovereign 
State). 
 59. See, e.g., OSCE, KOSOVO/KOSOVA:  AS SEEN, AS TOLD (1999) (reviewing the 
OSCE-Kosovo Verification Mission’s documentation of human rights abuses 
committed by the Serb regime in the year prior to NATO Bombing). 
 60. See, e.g., Guy Dinmore, Atrocity Probes Begin as Serbs Pull Out, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1, 
1998, at N8 (focusing on Western diplomats plans to examine accusations of Serbian 
atrocities against ethnic Albanians and possible atrocities committed by ethnic 
Albanians).  
 61. See Wilde, supra note 1, at 458. 
 62. See, e.g., Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and 
Security, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 93, 96 (1996)(discussing protection of military 
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Recent missions have been more conscious of human rights 
standards.63  In an address at Harvard, Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
acknowledged his commitment to promoting human rights in U.N. 
work.64  These values have translated into the language of Security 
Council resolutions.65 For example, the authorization for UNMIK 
includes broad statements of protecting and promoting human 
rights.66  The authorization of the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”) was more specific with a 
list of enumerated human rights standards by which U.N. personnel 
were bound.67  Despite the broad pledges to observe human rights, 
the specific method to implement these guidelines remains unclear,68 
particularly when coupled with the use of centralized power in 
administering these territories and the grant of blanket immunities to 
U.N. personnel.  Thus, the lack of guidelines, in addition to the 
lingering tolerance for U.N. derogation from human rights and 
interim mindset, makes it difficult to curb improper U.N. policies, 
particularly in areas like unlawful detentions.69 
II. OBLIGATIONS FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS:  HOLDING THE U.N. 
ACCOUNTABLE TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS THAT ARE REQUIRED 
OF STATES 
Despite the lack of clarity surrounding human rights 
implementation, the goal of achieving U.N. accountability remains 
unchanged and can be justified in several ways.  Member States have 
recognized that the U.N. has the capacities of a State, including that 
                                                          
personnel serving the international community); see infra Part II.A (discussing 
reactions to abuses of privileges and immunities). 
 63. See U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (including a list of human rights 
conventions that the mission planned to observe). 
 64. Kofi A. Annan, Strengthening United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights:  
Prospects and Priorities, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 6 (1997) (committing the U.N. to 
respecting human rights law as it is intimately related to long-lasting peace and 
sustainable development). 
 65. See U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12 (including in the responsibilities of 
the international civilian presence “protecting and promoting human rights”); see 
also U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (listing the human rights conventions 
applicable to the mission). 
 66. U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12, at 11(j). But see supra note 9 (noting 
UNMIK’s adoption of international human rights standards through regulation 
1999/24, rather than Security Council resolution). 
 67. See UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, supra note 9. 
 68. Annan, supra note 64, at 6 (acknowledging that “[h]uman rights 
considerations need to be integrated fully in all our approaches and activities, and in 
all our policy-making and programs, both at Headquarters and in the field,” but not 
clarifying how such goals should be achieved). 
 69. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 677 (arguing that the lack of articulated 
standards of human rights creates a gap in accountability). 
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of privileges and immunities and the ability to claim reparations for 
its agents.70  While the U.N.’s functions have expanded, the U.N. has 
not undertaken the reciprocal obligations that would be required of a 
State.71  This section reviews the grant of privileges and immunities to 
the U.N. and the ability of the U.N. to claim reparations, concluding 
that the U.N.’s obligations should parallel the rights afforded to it.72 
A. Privileges Afforded to International Organizations:  The Privilege of 
Immunities 
The U.N.’s exercise of privileges and immunities without 
comparable obligations demonstrates the inequity of applying 
standards based on status, rather than function.73  Although the U.N. 
is not beholden to the same human rights standards as States,74 it 
enjoys many of the benefits given to States,75 such as privileges and 
immunities.76  Recently, some non-governmental organizations have 
taken steps to curtail the application of privileges and immunities by 
applying humanitarian law to peace-keeping troops so that functions 
and obligations may more equally match.77  Still, it remains unclear 
how the competing obligations of privileges and immunities and 
humanitarian law operate together.78  While the application of 
                                                          
 70. See infra Part II.A-B (discussing privileges and immunities and the 
international legal personality of international organizations). 
 71. See FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES:  IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 
392 (1966) (describing the U.N.’s limited adoption of the humanitarian law 
obligations that would be required of States); see also infra note 94 and accompanying 
text. 
 72. See infra Part II.B (describing the rights the U.N. as an international 
organization has acquired in conducting its functions). 
 73. See Rawski, supra note 1, at 125 (arguing that the recognition of immunities 
in U.N. interim administrations at times may contradict the mission’s commitment to 
human rights standards). 
 74. See supra note 8 (noting that the U.N. has not consented to humanitarian law 
or human rights law). 
 75. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 
174, 179 (April 11) [hereinafter Reparation Case].  As a part of its recognition of 
personality, the I.C.J. noted that the U.N. has been able to conclude treaties, to make 
claims on behalf of its agents, and to engage in activities for the fulfillment of its 
purposes.  Id. 
 76. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art. 
3, sec. 9, Feb. 13, 1946, § 2, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1422, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, 20 [hereinafter 
Convention on Privileges and Immunities] (recognizing that official U.N. 
communications are of equivalent status as those of state diplomatic missions and are 
therefore afforded equally favorable treatment); U.N. CHARTER art. 105(1) 
(requiring Member States to recognize U.N. privileges and immunities).  But see 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 223, cmt. b (stating that international organizations 
“do not generally enjoy diplomatic immunity.”). 
 77. See generally SEYERSTED, supra note 71 (describing early attempts by the 
International Red Cross to persuade the U.N. to observe international humanitarian 
standards under the Geneva Conventions). 
 78. See OSCE, Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, 
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humanitarian law to peace-keeping troops is an important first step, 
the U.N. has not made similar international human rights standards 
applicable to its non-military personnel.79  The presence of these 
privileges without reciprocal obligations again underlines the 
inequity of the U.N.’s privileged status.80 
Member States have acknowledged that privileges and immunities 
should be granted to international organizations because the drafters 
of the U.N. Charter endowed the U.N. with such an authorization.81  
In Article 105, the U.N. Charter recognizes that the Organization 
“shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.”82  
Such privileges are commonly formalized through additional 
agreements.83  With its Member States, the U.N. formalized these 
guidelines in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations.84  Among other privileges, the treaty gave U.N. 
officials immunity from legal process and exemption from tax and 
duty charges.85  In present-day missions, the U.N. often concludes 
agreements with States to provide similar forms of privileges and 
immunities particular to the situation.86 
After reports of abuses, the U.N. moved to curb privileges and 
immunities afforded to peace-keeping troops through the adaptation 
of humanitarian law to its peace-keeping operations.87  Questions of 
                                                          
Review of the Criminal Justice System:  February 2000–July 2000, 1, 16-17 [hereinafter 
OSCE, LSMR 1] (observing that the Ombudsperson may provide guidance on the 
compatibility of international law with domestic laws in Kosovo, but it is unclear 
whether this guidance will be treated as binding on the Kosovo courts), available at 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/ criminal_justice.pdf (last 
visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 79. See supra note 8 (noting that the U.N. has not formally consented to the 
application of human rights or humanitarian law standards to its operations). 
 80. See Rawski, supra note 1, and accompanying text. 
 81. U.N. CHARTER art. 105(1). 
 82. Id. 
 83. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 467, cmt. f (citing the Headquarters 
agreement and the International Organizations Immunities Act as supplementary 
sources of privileges and immunities for the U.N.). 
 84. Convention on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 76, at pmbl.; see United 
Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the United Nations 
Secretary-General (listing 146 countries as parties to the Convention, which was first 
adopted in 1946 and entered into force at the end of that year), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIII/tre
aty1.asp (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 85. Convention on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 76, at sec. 18. 
 86. See generally Convention on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 76 
(stipulating that Member States afford certain privileges and immunities to the 
U.N.).  But see, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, supra note 12 (declaring unilaterally 
that the UNMIK and KFOR will be afforded privileges and immunities without the 
consent of the host state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). 
 87. See Daphna Shraga, U.N. Peacekeeping Operations:  Applicability of International 
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the abuse of privileges and immunities arose in the 1990s when the 
post-Cold War climate created regional power struggles that 
ultimately demanded international military intervention.88  After 
reports of U.N. peace-keeping troops committing abuses in Rwanda,89 
Mozambique,90 and Somalia,91 the U.N. was forced to look at the 
mechanisms to hold international peace-keepers accountable.92  The 
International Committee for the Red Cross (“ICRC”) led the way with 
a meeting to discuss U.N. accountability.93  The conference 
attendants helped draft a report that formed the foundation of the 
Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observation by United Nations 
Forces of International Humanitarian Law (“Bulletin”).94  The 
document enumerated the specific provisions of international 
                                                          
Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 
406, 407-09 (2000) (observing the changing role of peace-keeping operations and 
the need for legally binding standards of accountability to match these 
developments); see also Bulletin, supra note 51 (enumerating the fundamental 
principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations 
forces). 
 88. See generally Kelly Childers, Note, United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkan 
Wars and the Changing Role of Peacekeeping Forces in the Post-Cold War World, 8 TEMP. 
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 117 (1994) (crediting the end of the Cold War to the increase in 
the number of complex peacekeeping missions deployed under the auspices of the 
U.N.). 
 89. See Jennifer Gould, Peacekeeping Atrocities:  U.N. Soldiers Accused of Torture, 
Murder, Sexual Exploitation of Children, VILLAGE VOICE, June 24, 1997, 1997 WL 
11416180 (reporting that “[i]n Rwanda, in addition to ‘mismanaging’ $26 million, 
U.N. peacekeepers were accused of smuggling, sexual exploitation of women and 
children and criminal abuse of diplomatic immunity”). 
 90. See id. (reporting that U.N. troops in Mozambique were accused of sexually 
exploiting women and children). 
 91. See id. (noting that two Belgian soldiers were to stand trial for “roasting” a 
Somali child on an open fire during a U.N. peace-keeping mission in 1993).  
Another Belgian soldier will face prosecution “for forcing a Somali child to drink salt 
water, vomit, and worms.”  Id.; see Raf Casert, U.N. Peacekeepers Accused of Atrocities 
During Somalia Mission, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 24, 1997, 1997 WL 4547124 (noting 
that Italian peacekeepers allegedly raped Somali women and that “Canadian 
peacekeepers beat a Somali teenager to death and shot other civilians unprovoked”); 
see also Peacekeepers’ Atrocities in Somalia Stir Outrage, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 
24, 1997, at A2, 1997 WL 3199705 (stating that the U.N. Secretary-General expressed 
outraged at the atrocities of U.N. peace-keeping troops from Canada, Italy and 
Belgium).  See generally Rawski, supra note 1, at n.6 (summarizing instances where the 
U.N. should be held accountable in its field work). 
 92. See Shraga, supra note 87, at 406 (exploring the development of the 
guidelines for applying international humanitarian law to U.N. peace-keeping 
operations). 
 93. Id. at 407.  See generally SEYERSTED, supra note 71 (describing early attempts by 
the International Committee for the Red Cross to persuade the U.N. to observe 
international humanitarian standards under the Geneva Conventions).  While the 
U.N. assured the ICRC that its forces would comply with the spirit of the agreements, 
the U.N. did not make further arrangements to be bound by these conventions.  Id.  
The U.N. argued that, though it was not a signatory, Member States were parties and 
could determine how to apply the laws to their contingents.  Id. at 393. 
 94. Bulletin, supra note 51, at art. 6.1-6.3. 
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humanitarian law that the U.N. would respect, including prohibition 
of certain forms of combat and weapons,95 prohibition of certain 
orders,96 proper treatment of civilians and persons,97 and protection 
of the wounded, the sick, and medical and relief personnel.98  The 
agreement also included specific provisions on the treatment of 
detained persons, specifying how the U.N. should treat prisoners of 
war and detailing, among other things, that prisoners of war should 
receive sanitary housing, food and medical attention and remain free 
from torture.99  While extensive, these agreements do not include 
complete observation of human rights standards100 and are limited to 
the peace-keeping personnel engaged in armed conflict.101 
                                                          
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. art. 6.5. 
 97. Id. art. 7. 
 98. Id. art. 9. 
 99. Id. art. 8.  The Bulletin provides that: 
The United Nations force shall treat with humanity and respect for their 
dignity detained members of the armed forces and other persons who no 
longer take part in military operations by reason of detention. Without 
prejudice to their legal status, they shall be treated in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, as may be 
applicable to them mutatis mutandis. In particular: 
(a) Their capture and detention shall be notified without delay to the party 
on which they depend and to the Central Tracing Agency of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in particular in order to 
inform their families; 
(b) They shall be held in secure and safe premises which provide all possible 
safeguards of hygiene and health, and shall not be detained in areas exposed 
to the dangers of the combat zone; 
(c) They shall be entitled to receive food and clothing, hygiene and medical 
attention; 
(d) They shall under no circumstances be subjected to any form of torture 
or ill-treatment; 
(e) Women whose liberty has been restricted shall be held in quarters 
separate from men’s quarters, and shall be under the immediate supervision 
of women; 
(f) In cases where children who have not attained the age of sixteen years 
take a direct part in hostilities and are arrested, detained or interned by the 
United Nations force, they shall continue to benefit from special protection. 
In particular, they shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of 
adults, except when accommodated with their families; 
(g) ICRC’s right to visit prisoners and detained persons shall be respected 
and guaranteed.   
Id. 
 100. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 745 (7th ed. 1999) (defining humanitarian law as 
including the “law dealing with such matters as the use of weapons and other means 
of warfare, the treatment of war victims by the enemy, and generally the direct 
impact of war on human life and liberty”).  It also defines human rights law as “the 
freedoms, immunities and benefits that, according to modern values (especially at 
the international level), all human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right 
in the society in which they live.” Id.  Since U.N. interim administrations are typically 
post-conflict, humanitarian law is not applicable in a U.N. civil society development 
mission such as UNMIK or UNTAET.  It is unclear whether human rights law is 
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The application of codified and customary international 
humanitarian law to peace-keeping troops has raised questions of 
enforcement and competing obligations under privileges and 
immunities treaties.102  As Member States have preferred to serve as 
proxies for the attachment of responsibility for their nationals,103 
there has been limited success in pursuing violations, unless the 
conduct is exceedingly egregious.104  States are unlikely to prosecute 
unless the U.N. provides other institutional checks.105   Thus, unlawful 
conduct may continue with impunity without U.N. involvement or 
media attention.106  In effect, while the international humanitarian 
law applicable to a State is now applied to U.N. peace-keeping 
missions, a gap of effective enforcement remains.107  Furthermore, it 
is unclear how obligations under the Bulletin comport with blanket 
privileges and immunities granted to U.N. personnel on its 
missions.108 
                                                          
legally applicable since the typical vehicle would be the State rather than the U.N. 
 101. Bulletin, supra note 51, at pmbl., § 1.1 (applying “fundamental principles and 
rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces when in 
situations of armed conflict”). 
 102. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 650 (observing that while the U.N. promotes 
the integration of “human rights components” into peace-keeping operations, it does 
not empower these components with judicial or enforcement action when they 
discover violations).  But see Shraga, supra note 87, at 412 (arguing that even though 
international humanitarian law was not applicable to peace-keeping troops, the U.N. 
“implicitly assumed” and “practically implemented” these standards long before their 
formal recognition). 
 103. See Bulletin, supra note 51, § 4 (reserving prosecution of members of U.N. 
military personnel to their respective national courts). 
 104. See Stephen Bates, Troops Cleared on Child Roasting, THE GUARDIAN, July 1, 
1997, 1997 WL 2389469 (reporting that a Belgian court had acquitted the two U.N. 
peace-keepers whose photo was taken with a child roasting over a fire). The article 
noted that the decision was unexpected.  Id.  It also reported that nine other 
paratroopers had been acquitted of abusing civilians.  Id.; see supra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
 105. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTE OF KOSOVO, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 2000–2001 
(2001) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTE OF KOSOVO, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT] 
(tabulating sixty-two complaints filed with the Ombudsperson’s office against KFOR, 
forty-six on which the Ombudsperson could not take action because of the limited 
nature of his mandate), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/ 
annual%20report2000_2001.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  It is unclear whether any action has been taken on these 
cases. 
 106. See generally supra note 91 (noting Belgium’s move toward prosecution of 
peace-keepers after allegations of misconduct but eventual acquittal of these 
charges). 
 107. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 648-49 (criticizing the narrowing of 
international humanitarian obligations under the Bulletin to only certain provisions 
and the limitation of liability of third party claims that may be incurred by peace-
keeping troops). 
 108. OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1, ON THE 
COMPATIBILITY WITH RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF UNMIK REGULATION 
NO. 2000/47 ON THE STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF KFOR AND UNMIK AND 
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While criticism persists, the recognition of the applicability of 
humanitarian law to U.N. military operations is an important first 
step to diluting the artificial legal boundary between an international 
organization and a State when the fundamental question revolves 
around the function performed.109  The deployment of troops under 
the umbrella of an international organization does not make a long 
tradition of humanitarian law inapplicable.110  The U.N.’s adoption of 
principles of humanitarian law embodied in the Bulletin is an 
important step in tailoring an entire body of law to the 
Organization.111  However, given that humanitarian law is 
inapplicable in post-war settings, the U.N. should take a similar step 
in applying human rights law to its personnel in interim 
administrations.112 
B. The Reparation Case:  The Recognition of International Organizations 
As Having International Legal Personality 
In addition to privileges of immunity, the U.N. has also been 
recognized as possessing another characteristic traditionally afforded 
to States—international legal personality.113  Such a capacity allows 
the U.N. to take on duties once exclusively reserved to States.114  
                                                          
THEIR PERSONNEL IN KOSOVO AND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE REGULATION 
¶ 82 (2000) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1] (concluding that 
UNMIK and KFOR privileges and immunities were incompatible with international 
standards), at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/spec%20 
reps/pdf/sr1.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 109. But see Major Joseph P. “Dutch” Bialke, United Nations Peace Operations:  
Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict, 50 A.F. L. REV. 1, 57-58 
(2001) (criticizing the promulgation of the Bulletin as providing a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to applying humanitarian law to peace-keeping troops and advocating the 
adaptation of such law to the type of operation being executed). 
 110. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  The newspaper articles cited 
indicate that the U.N. peace-keeping soldiers were tried in their home States.  In 
cases of egregious conduct, the norm is for individual States to try their soldiers in 
the soldier’s home States.  Traditionally, a combination of international 
humanitarian law and domestic law, therefore, are applied to members of an 
international brigade. 
 111. See Bulletin, supra note 51, § 2 (adopting a non-exhaustive list of principles 
and rules of international humanitarian law upon military personnel).  But see 
Julianne Peck, The U.N. and the Laws of War:  How Can the World’s Peacekeepers Be Held 
Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 283, 309-10 (1995) (advocating that the 
U.N. accede to the Hague and Geneva Conventions to ensure that the Organization 
is held to the same standard as States in conduct during warfare). 
 112. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002, supra note 17 (criticizing 
UNMIK for not meeting international human rights standards); see also 
OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1, supra note 108, ¶ 84 (recommending the 
imposition of limits on UNMIK and KFOR immunity). 
 113. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 390 (Christopher C. Joyner 
ed., 1997)(noting that the I.C.J. acknowledged the legal personality of an 
international organization, a status typically reserved to States). 
 114. See generally A.S. MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST 
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Although the notion of functional necessity has been advantageous to 
expanding the U.N.’s role, it has not been coupled with reciprocal 
obligations.115  The following section reviews Reparation for Injuries 
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations116 (“Reparation Case”) and 
argues its approach as the foundation for asserting obligations upon 
the U.N. based on the functions it undertakes. 117 
1. A review of the Reparation Case 
The seminal Reparation Case has provided the legal basis allowing 
international organizations to take on roles traditionally afforded to 
States.118  In the case, the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”) held 
that the U.N. had legal personality based on the notion of functional 
necessity.119  The court noted that organizations such as the U.N. had 
capacity similar to a State.120  Member States had endowed the U.N. 
with certain duties and responsibilities so that the U.N. would be 
“exercising and enjoying functions and rights which can only be 
explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of 
international personality and the capacity to operate upon an 
international plane.”121  Emerging from the I.C.J.’s language was the 
theory of functional necessity, which implied that the U.N. did in fact 
have some degree of international legal personality, though this 
personality did not rise to the level of a State.122  Although not explicit 
in the Reparation Case, the I.C.J. clarified in a subsequent opinion that 
                                                          
STATES:  ASPECTS OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 72 (1995) (finding that, although the 
U.N.’s charter does not mention legal personality, in a survey of constituent 
instruments of international organizations, few had provisions explicitly granting 
international legal personality to the organization). 
 115. Id. at 172.  But see Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 643-44 (interpreting the 
possession of “duties” as the legal equivalent to obliging the U.N. to international 
human rights standards). 
 116. Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179. 
 117. While functional necessity is a term of art associated with the Reparations 
Case’s discussion of privileges and immunities, it is a useful term in discussing how 
rights and obligations should follow each other in the law of international 
organizations. 
 118. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL 
LAW:  UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY § 1563 (3d rev. ed. 1995) (noting that during the 
twentieth century there was a growing recognition of international organizations 
having legal personality separate from its Member States and stating that scholars 
have generally accepted this view); see also Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179 
(arguing that the U.N. is an international person with corresponding international 
rights and duties). 
 119. Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179; see U.N. CHARTER art. 104 
(acknowledging that the U.N. has “legal capacity” in the territory of a Member State 
to exercise its functions and to fulfill its purposes). 
 120. Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 175. 
 121. Id. at 179. 
 122. Id. 
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the U.N. should interpret functional necessity broadly.123  The 
recognition of functional necessity as the basis for U.N. capacity has 
allowed for significant expansion of the roles which the U.N. may 
undertake—so much so that the U.N. arguably behaves as a State 
more so than an international organization.124 
2. The problem with a function-based approach to grants of power for  
 international organizations 
While the Reparation Case has allowed for significant expansion of 
U.N. powers,125 it has also created an inconsistent standard for the law 
applicable to international organizations.126  Based on the notion of 
functional necessity, an international organization may exercise the 
powers implied in its purposes.127  Some of these functions, such as 
the interim administration of a region, mirror the functions of a 
State.128  Yet, since the international organization is not a State, it is 
not legally obligated to abide by the treaties and conventions to 
which States are signatories.129  The problems inherent in this 
approach are similar to those presented by the granting of privileges 
and immunities.130  Impunity prevails until tragedy spurs the U.N. to 
reform its notion of accountability.131  Similarly, in interim 
administrations, the U.N. has been delinquent in formally 
                                                          
 123. See generally MULLER, supra note 114, at 53 (clarifying that in the Mazilu 
Advisory Opinion, the I.C.J. rejected a restrictive interpretation of functional 
necessity).  It must be noted, however, that the Mazilu case dealt with the issue of 
functional necessity in the context of privileges and immunities of U.N. personnel. 
 124. Id.  But see Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179 (arguing that the U.N. should 
be governed by international law because it has international rights and duties). 
 125. See MULLER, supra note 114, at 34-35 (interpreting the I.C.J.’s Certain Expenses 
of the United Nations as allowing the U.N. to exercise a wide array of powers); see also 
MAGDALENA M. MARTIN MARTINEZ, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 77-78 (1996) (concluding that an international organization’s 
constituent instruments are not typically interpreted restrictively because a narrow 
interpretation may styme the development of the international organization’s future 
activities). 
 126. See supra note 8; see, e.g., infra note 200 (limiting signatories to human rights 
conventions to States though the U.N. had begun expanding its role to include state 
functions that would require analogous duties to a State). 
 127. See Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of 
International Organizations, 1971 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 147-49 (1971) (noting that 
the I.C.J. upheld the legality of the U.N.’s actions based on the function and purpose 
of the organization). 
 128. See SEYERSTED, supra note 71 (noting that jurisdiction over territories is one of 
the powers the U.N. possesses that is similar to a State). 
 129. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra 
note 118, § 1573 (noting that the U.N. is not a party to many of the human rights 
conventions and that it is not bound because it has not manifested consent). 
 130. See supra Part II.A (discussing privileges and immunities). 
 131. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (describing the abuses 
committed by the U.N. peace-keeping troops before the organization adopted some 
standards of international humanitarian law). 
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acknowledging which standards apply to these missions, despite its 
long involvement in interim administrations.132  The functional 
necessity approach therefore creates a loophole where international 
organizations are not held to the same standards as States performing 
the same tasks.133  Despite the Reparation Case’s acknowledgement of 
“duties,”134 without formal consent to, and enforcement of, these 
obligations, the U.N.’s actions remain unchecked.135 
One suggestion to correct for the lacuna created in a functional 
approach is to begin to tear down the artificial separation between 
international organizations and States.136  While international 
organizations do not possess the traditional characteristics of a State, 
they have begun to adopt functions once exclusively reserved to 
States.137  Privileges, immunities, reparations and territorial 
administration are all powers once exclusively considered within the 
domain of a State.138  Thus, in the case of interim administrations, the 
U.N. should be expected to abide by the human rights obligations of 
a State.139  Such an approach dilutes the distinction between States 
and international organizations and emphasizes capacity exercised by 
an organization, rather than its official status. 
III. THE U.N. SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE HUMAN 
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IT HELPED CREATE 
Because of these expanding functions,140 the U.N. should be held 
accountable to the human rights standards it helped create and 
                                                          
 132. See supra Part I.A. 
 133. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the application by the of the functional 
necessity standard to the U.N. in the Reparation Case). 
 134. See Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179. 
 135. See supra note 69. 
 136. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (5th 
ed. 1998) (noting that the duties of an international organization should be 
correlated to reciprocal responsibilities). 
 137. See SEYERSTED, supra note 71, at 402 (enumerating the capacities enjoyed by 
intergovernmental organizations that mirror the acts of sovereign States).  Seyersted 
notes that the U.N., much like States, exercises functions not authorized anywhere in 
its constituent instrument, so that the only functions it does not exercise are those 
that it has not yet had a reason to exercise. Id.  But see RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, 
§ 223, cmt. a (differentiating international organizations from States in that States 
exercise power of implied statehood and state sovereignty, whereas international 
organizations generally do not). 
 138. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 
10, § 223(a) (including in the capacities of a State its status as legal person and its 
ability to acquire and transfer property, to make contracts and treaties, and to pursue 
remedies under such agreements). 
 139. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 223 (recognizing that the U.N. has 
“duties created by international law” without clarifying whether such obligations 
would ever extend to human rights obligations). 
 140. See IPA, Transitional Administrations Chart, supra note 4.  
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universalize, even though it is not a signatory to these conventions.141  
Although there has been some acknowledgement of U.N. 
accountability to humanitarian law, the U.N. has been slow to take 
similar steps in applying human rights standards to its missions.142  
The following section outlines ways in which the U.N. has asserted its 
interest in human rights through its Charter and through its 
involvement in the creation of human rights instruments.  It then 
discusses the creation of regional human rights instruments that 
developed out of these international standards.  It also highlights the 
legal framework these instruments have created for dealing with 
unlawful detentions.  This section concludes that these instruments 
should apply to the U.N. because they represent principles which the 
U.N. has committed to follow in its charter.  Some of these norms 
have reached a level of customary international law, and these 
instruments contain rights afforded to individuals, for which the U.N. 
is an intermediary. 
A. The U.N.’s Commitment to Human Rights Through Its Charter and 
Sponsorship of International Human Rights Standards 
The U.N. Charter repeatedly states the U.N.’s commitment to 
human rights and social justice.143  In several provisions, the Charter 
reiterates the need for awareness and respect for human rights.  In its 
preamble, the U.N. Charter clarifies that part of its purpose is “to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights”144 and “to establish 
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising 
from treaties and other sources of international law can be 
maintained.”145  To achieve these ends, the peoples of the U.N. aim 
“to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as 
                                                          
 141. See infra note 188 (recognizing human rights conventions permit only State 
Parties to be signatories).  See generally Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 692 
(demonstrating that the U.N. undertakes international human rights obligations 
when it behaves as a State). 
 142. Compare U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12 (including a broad commitment 
to human rights standards), with U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (enumerating 
the human rights conventions the mission deems applicable to its work, a notion 
absent in earlier U.N. missions).  See generally Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State 
Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 267 (1999) 
(noting the contradiction in human rights law in that it is considered universal but 
largely applied by States in their own territories). 
 143. IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (3d ed. 1992).  See 
generally GLOBAL AGENDA:  ISSUES BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS 2001-2002 157-59 
(outlining the ways in which the U.N. has been involved in human rights).  The 
current Secretary-General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, has emphasized the importance 
of punishing those who abuse human rights.  Id. at 157. 
 144. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. 
 145. Id. 
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good neighbours.”146  While the contents of the preamble are not 
binding, they do provide context to the purposes of the U.N.147 
The articles of the U.N. Charter build upon the notion of U.N. 
interest in human rights.  In Article 1, the U.N. acknowledges its 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security by bringing 
about “by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of 
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of 
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of 
the peace.”148  The U.N. reiterates its commitment to human rights by 
noting as a purpose the achievement of “international co-operation 
in solving international problems of [a] . . . humanitarian character” 
and in “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms.”149  The theme of promotion of human rights 
is affirmed again and again in the U.N. Charter,150 underscoring the 
facilitative role that the U.N. plays in the formation of these ideals.151  
These values, however, have not created legally binding obligations.  
In the end, such language remains an idealistic goal. 
As an institution, the U.N. has been active in the promotion and 
codification of human rights.152  Under its auspices, the U.N. 
developed the three major documents that form the International 
Bill of Human Rights:  the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
                                                          
 146. Id. 
 147. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 56, art. 31 (setting 
out broad rules for the interpretation of treaties). 
 148. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1). 
 149. Id. art. 1(3). 
 150. See, e.g., id. arts. 55(c), 62(2), 68 (noting under the chapter for international 
economic and social cooperation that the U.N. must promote “universal respect for, 
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”).  Article 62(2) states that one of the 
functions and powers of the Economic and Social Council is that “[i]t may make 
recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.”  Article 68 proclaims that “the 
Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields 
and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be 
required for the performance of its functions.”  See BROWNLIE, supra note 143, at 1 
(noting the emphasis that the drafters of the U.N. Charter placed on the issue of 
human rights). 
 151. See U.N. CHARTER art. 13 (stating the General Assembly’s responsibility to 
promote cooperation between countries in the areas of politics, economics, culture, 
education, health, and human rights). 
 152. See BROWNLIE, supra note 143, at 1 (naming bodies within the U.N. which set 
international standards in the area of human rights, as well as emphasizing the 
U.N.’s effort in composing “legal instruments containing detailed provisions”).  See 
generally CHRISTOF HENS & FRANS VILJOEN, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES ON THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 5  (Kluwer Law Int’l 2002) (observing that 
U.N. treaties have molded modern concepts of basic human rights and the 
limitations of those rights). 
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(“UDHR”),153 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(“ICCPR”),154 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).155  The drafters of the UDHR saw 
the document as a standard of “common understanding” that would 
aid in the “full realization of this pledge.”156  The UDHR was to serve 
as a bridge between international peace and human rights.157  More 
than fifty years later, scholars view the fundamental rights 
enumerated in the UDHR as customary international law158 and thus 
perceive the document as having binding effect on States.159  As of 
August 2002, an overwhelming majority of States had become 
signatories to the ICCPR and the ICESCR.160  The broad 
dissemination of the UDHR161 and the near universal adoption of the 
                                                          
 153. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 154. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR] 
(recognizing basic human rights and freedoms, such as the right of self 
determination and striving to protect those rights and freedoms from suppression). 
 155. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter 
ICESCR].  See generally United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, Fact Sheet 
No. 2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights 1, 2 (describing the process of 
preparation and adoption of the ICCPR and the ICESCR and the reasons for 
similarities between the two documents), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu6/2/fs2.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University 
Law Review).  The major point of divergence from the ICCPR is that the ICESCR 
enumerates more specific rights of workers such as the right to work, the right to 
social security, the right to food, clothing, and housing, and the right to an 
education.  Id. arts. 6, 9, 11, 13.  The convention puts the onus upon State Parties to 
the covenant to take “international action for the achievement of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.” Id. art. 23. The convention names the ways in 
which the states may promote the rights enumerated in the covenant, such as “the 
conclusion of conventions,” and “the adoption of recommendations.”  Id. 
 156. UDHR, supra note 153, pmbl.  See generally PEASE, supra note 58, at 237 
(acknowledging that the UDHR, though not legally binding, “serves as an 
authoritative guide to interpretation of the U.N. Charter and represents the sense of 
the international community”). 
 157. See PEASE, supra note 58, at 237. 
 158. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 575 (commenting on the influence of the 
UDHR); see also Elsa Stamatopoulou, The Development of United Nations Mechanisms for 
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 687 (1998) 
(crediting the U.N. with the development of human rights laws and noting the 
worldwide increase of “pro-human rights movements” in the years after the adoption 
of the UDHR). 
 159. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 143, at 21 (commenting on the UHDR’s 
“considerable indirect legal effect”). 
 160. See Office of Human Commissioner of Human Rights, Status of Ratification of 
the Principle Human Rights Treaties (2003) (listing 149 states as parties to ICCPR and 
146 states as parties to ICESCR as of May 2003), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 161. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights is the Most Universal Document in the World (noting that the 
Guinness Book of World Records recognized the UDHR as the most widely 
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two other documents are a testament to the recognition of the three 
documents as a basis for international human rights standards.162 
Other intergovernmental organizations have adopted regional 
standards of human rights to supplement those outlined in 
international covenants.163  Using the broad support of the UDHR as 
a foundation, European nations sponsored the drafting of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”),164 which further 
specified human rights obligations of States.165  The Convention 
attempted to provide a mechanism for collective enforcement of the 
human rights standards adopted in the lofty principles of the 
UDHR.166  The U.N.’s involvement in and promotion of human rights 
norms reaffirms the Organization’s commitment to the creation of 
international human rights standards.167 
B. The International Human Rights Instruments’ Commitment to Rights of 
Detainees 
These human rights instruments, many of which the U.N. played a 
role in creating, include an express commitment to the rights of 
detainees.  The UDHR outlines several rights that may be implicated 
in the use of Executive Order detentions like those occurring in 
Kosovo.  First, in Article 3, the UDHR states that everyone has the 
right to liberty.168  The UDHR also recognizes an individual’s right to 
                                                          
translated document with its principles translated into more than 300 languages), at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/record.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file 
with the American University Law Review).  While such a feat does not testify to the 
universal recognition of the document, it is a testament to the push, at least within 
the UNHCHR office, to promulgate the statement of universal rights to all corners of 
the world. 
 162. See David Weissbrodt, An Introduction to the Sources of International Human 
Rights Law, C399 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 9 (1989) (crediting the U.N. with the codification of 
international human rights law). 
 163. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (3d ed. 
1999) (enumerating rights listed in the European Human Rights Convention).  This 
Comment will not discuss the international human rights conventions relevant to 
regions outside of Europe as they are not relevant to a discussion of UNMIK.  
However, it must be noted that other regions, such as the member States of the 
Organization of American States, have also adopted regional human rights 
instruments.  Id. at 272-73. 
 164. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 165. See, e.g., id. art. 2 (protecting against the arbitrary deprivation of one’s life). 
 166. See European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background, Organisation and 
Procedure ¶ 1 (Jan. 2003) (citing the impetus of drafting the ECHR as the need to 
assure there were means of “collective enforcement” of UDHR), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm. (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 167. See supra notes 152, 162 and accompanying text (recognizing the U.N.’s role 
in shaping modern human rights law). 
 168. UDHR, supra note 153, at art. 3. 
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“effective remedy by the competent national tribunal” for violation of 
rights.169  The subsequent article provides that “no one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary arrest [or] detention,”170 thus explicitly 
condemning such practices.  Finally, Article 10 states that “everyone is 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal.”171  Taken together, these articles emphasize that those in 
detention should receive a hearing and that they should be provided 
with a means for remedy if none exists. 
Similarly, the ICCPR provides guidance on the rights of 
detainees.172 It states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention”173 and that those who are arrested should be 
notified promptly of the charges.174  In addition, the ICCPR provides 
that a defendant should “be brought promptly before a judge”175 and 
should be “entitled to take proceedings before a court.”176  The 
ICCPR only allows derogation from these principles in case of exigent 
circumstances.177  Some of these provisions have become customary 
international law creating a binding obligation on States.178 
Finally, the ECHR also includes provisions clarifying the rights and 
remedies of detainees.179  Article 5 enumerates an individual’s “right 
to liberty and security of person.”180  Much like the ICCPR, the ECHR 
mandates that those arrested be informed in their own language of 
the charges against them181 and be “brought promptly before a 
judge.”182  The Article makes clear that a trial must be held within a 
reasonable time of detention183 and that the detainee must be 
released “if the detention is not lawful.”184  Unique in the ECHR is a 
provision that mandates that those arrested or detained in 
contravention to Article 5 should “have an enforceable right to 
                                                          
 169. Id. art. 8. 
 170. Id. art. 9. 
 171. Id. art. 10. 
 172. See ICCPR, supra note 154, at art. 9 (outlining the rights and procedures 
taken to those who are or might be detained). 
 173. ICCPR, supra note 154, art. 9(1). 
 174. Id. art. 9(2). 
 175. Id. art. 9(3). 
 176. Id. art. 9(4). 
 177. See id. at art. 4(1)-(3) (stating that derogation may occur “in the time of 
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”). 
 178. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10 (recognizing that several practices are 
prohibited under customary international law, including prolonged arbitrary 
detention and violations of internationally recognized human rights). 
 179. ECHR, supra note 164, at art. 5 
 180. Id. art. 5(1). 
 181. Id. art. 5(2). 
 182. Id. art. 5(3). 
 183. Id. art. 5(4). 
 184. Id. art. 5(4). 
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compensation.”185  The express attention to the rights of detainees in 
the UDHR, ICCPR, and ECHR, as well as the broad acceptances of 
these standards, emphasizes the importance of affording human 
rights in detention situations. 
C. Applying International Human Rights Instruments to the U.N. 
Despite the broad scope and acceptance of these human rights 
standards, it is evident that their full application is lacking.  The 
norms created by these documents should be applicable to the U.N. 
when it performs state functions.186  While the U.N. has been 
instrumental in the creation of international human rights 
standards,187 the U.N. itself is not a signatory to these conventions 
since the drafters write conventions from the perspective of States 
and expressly recognize States as signatories.188  Additionally, some 
                                                          
 185. Id. art. 5(5). 
 186. See Wilde, supra note 1, at 456-57 (clarifying the non-sequitor in which U.N. 
personnel are allowed to take on functions performed by state actors but not held to 
comparable obligations).  Wilde attributes this shortcoming to two factors:  
(1) because international law assumes that international organizations and States 
perform different functions; and (2) because administration of a territory is 
considered temporary.  Id. at 457-58; see supra note 10 and accompanying text 
(outlining some provisions of human rights treaties that have gained the status of 
custom and thus are also binding on states).  But see C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF 
THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 240 (James Crawford & 
David Johnston eds., 1996) (arguing that although international organizations do 
not exercise the same powers as States, they do enter into agreements that “could 
give rise to international obligations”). 
 187. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (noting that one of the purposes of the U.N. is “to 
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights”). The charter also states in Section a 
that the General Assembly (G.A.) will promote the development of international law 
and its codification and stating in section b that the G.A. should assist “in the 
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Id. art. 13, para. 1; see Jose 
E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 213, 217-18 (2002), 
citing ROY LEE, MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES:  AN 
APPRAISAL IN CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW:  ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
GEORG SCHWARTZENBERGER ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 157-58, 177-216 (Bin Chang & 
Edward Brown eds., 1998) (crediting international organizations with the rise in 
regulation of prominent sectors of international law, such as international human 
rights law, through treaties). 
 188. See ICCPR, supra note 154, at pmbl. (beginning with “[t]he States Parties to 
the present Covenant”); see also ICESCR, supra note 155, at pmbl. (beginning with 
“[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant”).  The language of the preamble of 
both conventions explicitly recognizes the obligations as relating to States rather 
than international legal personalities.  But see U.N., HUMAN RIGHTS, A COMPILATION 
OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING 
TO NATIONAL OR ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 140, art. 9, U.N. Doc. 
ST/HR/1/Rev.5, U.N. Sales No. E94.XIV.1 (Vol. I, Part 1) (1994) (specifying that 
“specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system shall 
contribute to the full realization of the rights and principles set forth in the present 
Declaration, within their respective fields of competence”).  While Article 1 
emphasizes the importance of States adopting legislation to achieve the declarations 
aims, Article 9 makes clear an intent of the G.A. to extend obligations to the entire 
U.N.  It must be noted that resolutions of the G.A. are not considered binding. 
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scholars argue that such obligations should not be imposed upon an 
international organization because it has not consented.189 
Nonetheless, human rights law should be applied to an 
international organization functioning as a State.  First, despite the 
lack of binding status of human rights conventions and declarations 
on the U.N., the Organization has recognized in its Charter a 
commitment to the promotion of these principles.190  These 
conventions are in fact the expansion and development of the 
principles of the U.N. Charter.191  As such, even though the U.N. is 
not a signatory, it is obligated to follow international human rights 
standards based on the purpose enumerated in its own charter.192  In 
applying this argument to the administration of territories, one can 
argue that the U.N. is the source of the law.193  As such, the U.N. must 
enforce adherence to international human rights standards and 
provide a means of remedy for violations.194 
Second, the UDHR and ICCPR recognize that obligations may be 
attached to non-state entities, thus supporting the application of 
human rights law to the U.N.  Article 30 of the UDHR and Article 5 
of the ICCPR recognize that “any State, group or person” may not 
derogate from the rights and freedoms enumerated in each 
instrument.195  Under a broad interpretation of the term “group,” the 
U.N. should be included since it is an intergovernmental 
organization stepping in for the State.196  Consequently, the UDHR 
                                                          
 189. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 118, § 1572 (raising the question of 
whether international organizations, which do not possess the traditional 
characteristics of a State, such as territory, may be bound by the standards of 
international law and customary international law without their consent); see also 
supra Part III.A (discussing U.N. accountability in humanitarian law). 
 190. U.N. CHARTER pmbl. 
 191. See U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1 (“The General Assembly shall initiate studies 
and make recommendations for the purposes of . . . promoting international co-
operation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of 
international law and its codification.”). 
 192. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the purposes of the U.N. are to 
“maintain international peace and security” and “to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” by conforming to “principles 
of justice and international law”). 
 193. See, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6 (charging the U.N. with the 
duty of administering the interim administration, including many of the functions of 
a State). 
 194. See infra Part VI (discussing the liabilities created in taking a function based 
approach, which may require the creation of a claims commission); see also Rawski, 
supra note 1, at 124-25 (arguing that broad grants of immunity violate an individual’s 
right to remedy). 
 195. UDHR, supra note 153, at art. 30; ICCPR, supra note 154, at art. 5. 
 196. See UDHR, supra note 153, at art. 30 (finding that the articles of the UDHR 
go further than applying its delegation solely to the States by specifically mentioning 
“any . . . group,” and thus the U.N. fits into this category); see also ICCPR, supra note 
154, at art. 5. 
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and ICCPR may be applicable to the U.N. when it performs functions 
as a surrogate for the State, even though the Organization is not a 
signatory and has not expressed other forms of consent.  These 
standards provide valuable guidelines for the administration of a 
State, particularly for interim administrations because such 
institutions do not have a culture of historical standards from which 
to direct their activities.197  The approach also avoids the inconsistency 
of results in the case of human rights standards applicable to the 
territory of Kosovo.  Since the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(“FRY”)198 had only acceded to the conventions to which Yugoslavia 
had signed, which did not include the ECHR, the U.N.’s adoption of 
the ECHR made applicable conventions that were not binding to FRY 
as a whole.199 
Finally, while human rights instruments recognize State Parties,200 
the rights are afforded to individual citizens of the State as the vehicle 
for promoting the enumerated rights.201  As such, the rights continue 
with the individual, despite U.N. intervention.202  With the rights 
vested in the individual, the U.N. intervention is merely a surrogate 
vehicle for the administration of human rights standards applicable 
to the community.203  This approach emphasizes that legal rights flow 
to the individual with the U.N. as an intermediary.204 
Although not evidence of a valid legal basis for applying human 
rights standards to the U.N., it is interesting to note that human 
rights groups and national judiciaries often cite the ECHR and 
                                                          
 197. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (commenting that the UDHR aids 
in the understanding of the U.N. Charter and also embodies the sentiments of the 
international community of signatory states). 
 198. FRY is presently called Serbia and Montenegro, of which Kosovo is still legally 
recognized as a part.  
 199. UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, supra note 9. 
 200. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 154, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 155, at pmbl.; 
UDHR, supra note 153, at pmbl.  All three documents emphasize that signatories are 
limited to State Parties or Member States. 
 201. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 154, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 155, at pmbl. 
(emphasizing that signatories are limited to State Parties but acknowledging that the 
rights are manifest in “all members if the human family” and the “individual”). 
 202. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 100, at 745 (describing “human 
rights” as rights that individuals should claim in a society); ICCPR, supra note 154, at 
pmbl. (illustrating that despite the recognition of “State Parties”  the preamble refers 
to the duties individuals have to other individuals in a community).  It also states that 
in relation to detentions, the rights are afforded to “everyone” and “anyone.”  Id. 
art. 9.  This language implies that because the rights are afforded to individuals 
through the state, individuals themselves may be responsible for the monitoring and 
implementing of rights. 
 203. See ICCPR, supra note 154, at pmbl. (singling out the individual as having a 
duty to protect the rights set forth in the ICCPR). 
 204. See id. 
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ICCPR.205  The use of these instruments emphasizes their importance 
in providing an internationally recognized standard.  While these 
human rights groups and national judiciaries have not articulated the 
legal basis for applying these standards, one can argue that the if 
U.N. is a subject of international law,206 it is at least bound to the 
conventions that have risen to the level of custom.  The regular use of 
these conventions as international standards, however, necessitates a 
clarification of how international organizations should apply 
international human rights standards, as their application may have 
implications on enforcement and remedies.207  The U.N.’s role in the 
creation of human rights law,208 the recognition of these obligations 
as forming international standards,209 and the regular application of 
these standards210 provide strong support for the use of international 
human rights standards as the basis for U.N. obligations in interim 
administrations.211 
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN KOSOVO 
Despite uncertainty regarding accountability, the U.N. has 
historically engaged in interim administrations and is likely to 
continue its involvement.212  UNMIK is one of the more recent 
examples of U.N. involvement in state-building.213  In the following 
                                                          
 205. See, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, On the Establishment of the Ombudsperson 
Institution in Kosovo § 1.1 (June 30, 2000) [hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 2000/38] 
(enumerating the ECHR and its Protocols and the ICCPR as the particular human 
rights standards that should guide the Ombudsperson’s analysis), at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg38-00.htm (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 206. See Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179 (referring to the U.N. as an 
organization that embodies internationalism). 
 207. See generally Rex Honey, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS? 227, 236 (Robert G. Patman ed., 2000) (advocating the accession of 
organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade 
Organization to human rights norms); UNMIK Regulation 2000/44, On the Privileges 
and Immunities of the World Bank Group and its Officials in Kosovo § 2 (Aug. 10, 2000) 
(clarifying the immunity status of another international organization, the World 
Bank, and its personnel, but shedding no light on its human rights obligations while 
working in Kosovo), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
regulations/2000/reg44-00.htm (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 208. See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text. 
 210. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
 211. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 696-97 (arguing that while there is no system 
by which to hold an international organization accountable, international law may 
provide grounds for deeming actions unlawful). 
 212. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586-87 (describing the U.N.’s past involvement in 
territorial administrations). 
 213. See, e.g., UNMIK Online, UMNIK at a Glance (including in the mission’s 
mandate the U.N.’s role in state-building), at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
intro.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University Law 
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section, this Comment will examine the tangible consequences of the 
deviation from, and lack of enforcement of, human rights standards 
with the UNMIK SRSG’s use of Executive Orders for detentions.  The 
discussion will begin with background on the mission, the creation of 
institutional checks, and the inability to correct violations despite the 
creation of additional offices. 
A. The Authorization of the Mission 
Following the NATO bombings of the former Yugoslavia, the U.N. 
deployed international personnel to assist in the rebuilding of 
Kosovo.214  Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, the U.N. 
assumed the responsibility of maintaining international peace and 
security, as delegated to the Security Council in its Chapter VII 
powers.215  The mission undertook the tasks of providing 
humanitarian relief, facilitating reconstruction, and overseeing the 
development of provisional institutions.216  Additionally, the 
resolution expressly recognized the responsibility of the international 
civilian presence217 in “[p]rotecting and promoting human rights.”218  
Matched to these responsibilities, the U.N. divided the mission into 
four phases:  humanitarian relief, reconstruction, institution building 
and democratization, and a transitional administration.219 
To achieve these ends, the Secretary-General appointed a Special 
Representative to oversee the territorial administration of Kosovo.220  
In the first regulation that the interim administration promulgated, 
the SRSG announced the scope of his power to encompass legislative, 
executive and some judicial authority.221 In effect, the SRSG became 
the center of authority with no one but the Security Council and the 
                                                          
Review). 
 214. See U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12 (authorizing the deployment of civil 
and security presences to Kosovo). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. § 11. 
 217. Id. § 10 (including in the international civilian presence those working in 
OSCE, UNMIK and other international agencies providing humanitarian assistance 
and institutional support). 
 218. Id. § 11(j). 
 219. See UNMIK at a Glance, supra note 213. 
 220. See U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12, § 6 (authorizing the Secretary-
General to appoint a Special Representative “to control the implementation of the 
international civil presence” and “to coordinate closely with the international 
security presence to ensure that both presences operate toward the same goals and 
in a mutually supportive manner”). 
 221. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, § 1(1).  Section 1(2) states that 
the “Special Representative of the Secretary-General may appoint any person to 
perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or 
remove such person.” Id. § 1(2). The two paragraphs taken together illustrate the 
almost absolute power vested in the SRSG. 
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Secretary-General as his check.222  While UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 
explicitly authorizes the SRSG to assist only in administering the 
judiciary, it also allows the SRSG to appoint and to remove judges, 
which in effect creates absolute judicial authority in the SRSG.223 
The rationale for vesting so much authority with an international 
actor flows from the tumultuous history of the former Yugoslavia.224  
In Kosovo particularly, the U.N. recognized that the decade-long 
oppression under the Serbian-led Yugoslav Army made it impossible 
to guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
without an international presence.225  Furthermore, local Kosovar 
Albanians, who had created parallel institutions during the years of 
apartheid in provincial administration, had not been involved in 
official regional administration for more than a decade,226 creating a 
knowledge-gap in administering institutions.227  Additionally, with the 
                                                          
 222. See Beauvais, supra note 14, at 1110-11 (dubbing the UNTAET authority of 
the administration of East Timor as the “de facto governmental authority,” much like 
the mission in Kosovo); see also UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, supra note 9, § 1 
(indicating that all legislative authority, executive authority, and judicial 
administration is vested in UNTAET for exercise by the Transitional Administrator).  
Interestingly, the language of UNTAET Regulation 1999/1 mirrors UNMIK 
Regulation 1999/1.  While Secion 2 of both regulations recognize international 
human rights standards as those that will govern the mission, the UNTAET 
Regulation explicitly enumerates the conventions that will be applicable to the 
interim administration.  Id. § 2. 
 223. See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 224. By the time of the Kosovo crisis, the U.N. had been involved in two other 
missions in the former Yugoslavia, one in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a temporary 
mission in Slavonia in Croatia.  See generally RICHARD WEST, TITO:  THE RISE AND FALL 
OF YUGOSLAVIA (1999) (providing historical perspective on the formation and 
disintegration of Yugoslavia). 
 225. See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA:  DEATH OF A NATION 
(1997) (describing the splintering of the Republics of former Yugoslavia); see also TIM 
JUDAH, KOSOVO:  WAR AND REVENGE (2000) (recounting the events leading the 
bombing of Kosovo and its consequences).  Ironically, while the criticism for the last 
decade had been of the Serbian oppression of Kosovars Albanian, one phenomenon 
of the end of the war was Kosovar Albanian retaliation against remaining Serb 
populations and other ethnic minorities who were accused of being complicit or 
outright supporting the Serb regime while it was in power in Kosovo.  Id. at 295.  But 
see Nataša Kandi , The Lesson of Orahovac:  The International Administration in Kosovo 
Encourages Violence Against Serbs, Feb. 1, 2000 (accusing UNMIK, OSCE and KFOR of 
supporting the violence committed against Serb minority communities in 
southeastern Kosovo), at http://www.kosovo.com/ orahovac.html (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 226. See NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO:  A SHORT HISTORY 349 (1999) (recounting the 
history of human rights abuses against Kosovar Albanians and their dismissal from 
positions in schools and hospitals). 
 227. See OSCE, Factsheet:  OSCE and Capacity-Building (June 2002) (listing co-
operation as one of the challenges of capacity-building in Kosovo since its citizens 
have a long history of working in parallel structures), available at 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/factsheet/general/capacitybuilding_ 
factsheeteng.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review). 
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fear of reprisal, as witnessed in other missions,228 the U.N. hesitated to 
vest full and immediate control in local hands.229  With these factors 
in mind, the SRSG deemed it best to centralize authority as 
promulgated in UNMIK Regulation 1999/1.230 
B. Creation of Institutional Checks 
Responding to an earlier commitment of the mission,231 the first 
SRSG Bernard Kouchner initiated the creation of an 
Ombudsperson’s office.232  The mandate assigned the Ombudsperson 
to “promote and protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and 
legal entities.”233  Although appointed by the SRSG, the 
Ombudsperson was to act independently and free of charge.234  The 
jurisdiction of the office extended to the investigation of “complaints 
from any person or entity in Kosovo concerning human rights 
violations and actions constituting an abuse of authority by the 
interim civil administration or any emerging central or local 
institution.”235  The mandate explicitly authorized the application of 
the ECHR236 and its Protocols and the ICCPR.237   
                                                          
 228. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina:  The International 
Community’s Responsibility, Jan. 6, 1996, at 45-48 (describing the revenge attacks 
following peace settlements in Bosnia). 
 229. See generally Kosovo Temporary Media Commissioner, Report 2000-2001, 
available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/bodies/tmc/pdf/tmcreport.pdf (last visited 
July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).  In one of the most 
egregious incidents of local reprisal, the local Albanian-language newspaper Dita 
published the name, workplace and route of travel of a Serbian man working for 
UNMIK.  Id. at 7.  The newspaper accused him of working for the Serb regime 
during the NATO bombing of Kosovo.  Id.  The man was later found dead.  Id.  
While the OSCE condemned the acts and placed sanctions on Dita, such types of 
allegations continued, creating an atmosphere of fear and hostility between the 
majority Albanian community and the ethnic minorities within the territory of 
Kosovo.  Id. 
 230. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, § 1 (vesting authority in the 
SRSG for effectively all government functions). 
 231. See OSCE Permanent Council, PC Journal No. 237, Agenda Item 2, Dec. No. 
305, July 1, 1999 [hereinafter OSCE, Decision 305] (including in its mandate that 
the OSCE would facilitate the creation of an Ombudsperson Institute), available at 
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/1999/decisions/pced305.pdf (on file with 
the American University Law Review). 
 232. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205 (directing the SRSG to 
appoint an Ombudsperson in Kosovo to ensure UNMIK complies with the U.N. 
Security Council resolution standard of human rights for the region). 
 233. Id. § 1.1.  See generally Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions:  The Role of 
National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 19-23 (2000) (outlining the role which ombudspersons 
institutions may play in promoting human rights in the State). 
 234. UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205, § 2.1-2.2. 
 235. Id. § 3.1. 
 236. See id. § 1.1 (ensuring that all persons of Kosovo can exercise those human 
rights and fundamental freedoms provided by the international human rights 
standards of the ECHR).  The SRSG authorized the application of ECHR even 
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Despite widespread support for creating the institution, numerous 
constraints delayed the establishment of the office and the 
appointment of an Ombudsperson until nearly the end of the second 
year of the mission.238  In addition, the mandate expressly excluded 
the Kosovo Force (“KFOR”) from the jurisdiction of the 
Ombudsperson.239  The regulation limited the Ombudsperson’s 
authority to submitting reports and recommendations to the KFOR 
commander based on the complaints the Ombudsperson received.240  
The KFOR commander determines further action.241  The inclusion 
of the international military presence under the mandate of the 
Ombudsperson is a noticeable step forward in recognizing the 
responsibility of peacekeeping troops.  As NATO-deployed troops, 
KFOR falls directly under the oversight of an international 
organization and works in coordination with the U.N.  While 
documents such as the Bulletin open the way for military forces of 
international organizations to be held accountable for war time 
conduct, the limited jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson over KFOR 
point to the ever-present gap in the realm of human rights law over 
military forces. 
C. U.N. and KFOR Abuse of Privileges and Immunities 
Since it became operational, the Ombudsperson’s office has been 
handling a full caseload242 with considerable focus on the abuses of 
                                                          
though Yugoslavia, the country of which Kosovo remained a part, had not become a 
party to the agreement.  Id.; see supra Part III (discussing the application of human 
rights standards to the U.N.).  Although this Comment does not discuss the 
implications of this arrangement, this situation creates an interesting wrinkle in that 
the source of the law is actually the interim state rather than the host state.  In the 
Kosovo Mission, the U.N. undertook obligations the government of the former 
Yugoslavia may not find legally valid. 
 237. See id. § 1.1 (ensuring that all persons of Kosovo can exercise those human 
rights and fundamental freedoms provided by the international human rights 
standards of the ICCPR); see also United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral 
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, ICESCR (listing Yugoslavia as having 
ratified the ICESCR in 1967, 1971, and again Mar. 12, 2001, after the break up of its 
republic), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternet 
bible/partI/chapterIV/treaty5.asp#N2 (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
 238. See generally OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Independent Bodies-Ombudsperson’s 
Institution (mentioning that presently the Permanent Council of the OSCE and the 
United States provide funding for the Ombudsperson Institute), at 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/bodies/ombudsperson/ (last visited July 8, 2003) (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
 239. UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205, § 3.5. 
 240. Id.  In part, this distinction is made for KFOR since the troops deployed in 
Kosovo came under NATO auspices, rather than directly under U. N. command, so 
that KFOR operates in coordination with UNMIK. 
 241. Id. 
 242. OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTE OF KOSOVO, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 105. 
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U.N. and KFOR.243  In Special Report No. 1, Ombudsperson Marek 
Antoni Nowicki questioned the compatibility of UNMIK privileges 
and immunities under UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 with 
international human rights standards following complaints that 
KFOR had occupied or damaged private property.244  The report 
concluded that the UNMIK Regulation on privileges and immunities 
was incompatible with the ECHR standard for international human 
rights.245  The Ombudsperson recommended that the SRSG establish 
a Claims Commission to address the complaints of the citizenry, 
ensure dissemination of this information to the public, and take steps 
to encourage KFOR compliance and compensation for damages. 246 
Although the report focused on the privileges and immunities of 
KFOR, the Ombudsperson also drew attention to the consolidation of 
power within the office of the SRSG.247  The Ombudsperson noted 
that investing the powers of two branches within the SRSG was 
contrary to fundamental principles of law when there was no judicial 
review, as is the case when applying UNMIK Regulation 2000/47.248  
Additionally, civilians did not have access to the regulation because it 
was written only in English and had not been translated to Serbian or 
Albanian, the languages spoken by the local populations.249  The 
combination of overbroad protections and the lack of information to 
the citizenry leads to potential abuses.  Accordingly, Nowicki argued 
that the UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 did not protect citizens from 
the arbitrary application of law by the government.250 
                                                          
The annual report cited that approximately 1,000 persons visited the Institution 
following its opening and these persons lodged 344 formal complaints.  Id. at 2.  Of 
the applications filed, the Ombudsperson rejected about sixty percent.  Id.  Of the 
344 applications filed, the subject matter of the cases divided as follows:  property 
issues such as governmental takings, 141 cases; employment issues, 92 cases; fair trial 
issues, 38 cases; and personal liberty and security issues, 30 cases.  Id. at 8.  The 
remaining cases dealt with impunity, abuse of authority, standard of living, right to 
respect for the home, freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment, and equal 
protection.  Id. at 9. 
 243. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1, supra note 108, ¶ 2. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. ¶ 82. 
 246. Id. ¶ 84. 
 247. Id. ¶ 24. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. ¶ 25. 
 250. Id. ¶ 27.  See generally Press Release, Amnesty International, No Impunity for 
the International Community (June 18, 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty, No Impunity] 
(describing another incident of human rights abuse and the U.N. response to an 
Austrian police officer’s alleged maltreatment of a detainee), at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR70052002?open&of=ENG-YUG (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
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D. Executive Orders for Detention 
1. The Ombudsperson on detentions 
Bearing in mind this ineffectiveness of the UNMIK system, the 
Ombudsperson issued a comprehensive report outlining the 
problems with Executive Order detentions based on the applicable 
human rights law.251  The issue of the incompatibility of law in Special 
Report No. 1252 became the focus of Special Report No. 3 in which the 
Ombudsperson addressed the issue of “Conformity of Deprivations of 
Liberty under ‘Executive Orders’ with Recognized International 
Standards.”253  The SRSG’s prolonged detention of Kosovars has 
raised considerable ire against the U.N. administration among 
Kosovars,254 international human rights organizations,255 and the 
Organization of Security and Co-operation (“OSCE”).256  In analyzing 
the SRSG’s obligations under regional human rights instruments, the 
Ombudsperson concluded that the detentions under the Executive 
Order of the SRSG were not lawful under ECHR Article 5(1), which 
outlines an individual’s right to liberty and security.257  The 
Ombudsperson emphasized the necessity of judicial review over 
detentions.258  As noted earlier, the Ombudsperson viewed the vesting 
                                                          
 251. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT 3, supra note 14. 
 252. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT 1, supra note 108. 
 253. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT 3, supra note 14. 
 254. See generally Kosovapress News Agency, Protests Continue Over Kosovo Albanian’s 
Extended Detention, Sept. 1, 2000 (reporting that more than 500 protesters gathered in 
a village in eastern Kosovo to demand the release of Afrim Zeqiri who was being held 
under SRSG Orders). 
 255. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Criminal Justice System Still on 
Trial (Nov. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Amnesty, Criminal Justice] (raising concerns 
regarding whether a judge had authorized the prolonged detention of Zeqiri who 
was arrested in May 2000), at http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ 
ENGEUR700632000?open&of=ENG-YUG (on file with the American University Law 
Review); Amnesty, Afrim Zeqiri, supra note 17 (criticizing SRSG Hans Haekkerup’s 
continued detention of Zeqiri after the initial Executive Orders had expired and 
without legal process); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 EUROPE:  
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (2002) (stating that the Detention Review 
Commission “failed to provide detainees with the means to challenge their 
detention.”), available at http://www.amnesty.org (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 256. See OSCE, LSMR 2, supra note 13 (criticizing pre-trial detention orders); see 
also OSCE, Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Review 
of the Criminal Justice System:  September 2001-February 2002, at 45-46 (2002) [hereinafter 
OSCE, LSMR 4] (criticizing Executive Order detentions). 
 257. ECHR, supra note 164, at art. 5(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty and 
security of person.  No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases 
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”).  Article 5 goes on to specify 
the parameters of detention and arrest.  See infra note 259. 
 258. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, supra note 14, ¶ 17 (concluding that 
the centralization of authority in the SRSG violated the principle of separation of 
powers). 
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of judicial administration in the SRSG as creating a prima facie 
violation of the ECHR because the SRSG could effectively deny 
judicial review to a detainee.259 
2. Abuses of detention 
a. The case of Afrim Zeqiri:  Institutional checks without the teeth 
The SRSG’s use and abuse of executive orders in Kosovo 
demonstrates the problems that arise from a virtually unchecked 
centralized authority.  The case of Afrim Zeqiri emphasizes the need 
to rethink the means by which the Security Council applied and 
enforced human rights standards on interim administrations.  U.N. 
police arrested Zeqiri, an ethnic Albanian, for the murder of three 
Serbs and the attempted murder of two in the Kosovo village 
Cernica.260  He was arrested in May 2000 and held him based on 
judicial detention orders until late July 2000.  Following the lapse of 
the judicial detention order, Bernard Kouchner extended Zeqiri’s 
detention261 pursuant to UNMIK Regulation 1999/26262 because local 
prosecutors chose to abandon the case.263  In September 2000, an 
international investigating judge permitted another thirty-day 
extension.264  When the series of executive orders and judicial 
                                                          
 259. Id. ¶ 21; see also ECHR, supra note 164, at art. 5, ¶ 3 (“Everyone arrested or 
detained in accordance with the provision of para. 1.c. of this articles shall be 
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise 
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release 
pending trial.”). 
 260. Kouchner Prolongs Detention of Albanian Murder Suspect, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
July 29, 2000 [hereinafter Kouchner Prolongs Detention], available at 
http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/ july00/hed400.shtml (on file with the 
American University Law Review).  See Interview with Michael Hartmann, UNMIK 
International Prosecutor Feb. 2000-Jan. 2003 and prosecutor for the Zeqiri case 
(June 2003) (noting that “Serb reaction to this ethnic hatred motivated attack caused 
severe public order and political problems for UNMIK, which had been criticized by 
NGOs and OSCE for failing to adequately protect minority rights and safety.”). 
Statements are his personal opinion, and do not necessary reflect the position of 
UNMIK. 
 261. Kouchner Prolongs Detention, supra note 260. 
 262. UNMIK Regulation 1999/26, On the Extension of Periods of Pre-trial Detention, 
Dec. 22, 1999 [hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 1999/26] (permitting an Ad Hoc 
Court of Final Appeal to extend pre-trial custody for up to six months), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg26-99.htm. (last visited July 26, 
2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 263. Interview with Michael Hartman, supra note 260 (noting that Kouchner 
decided to extend the detention of murderers because the local judiciary’s decision 
to pursue the case seemed founded on ethnic bias). 
 264. Press Briefing, UNMIK, Zeqiri (Sept. 15, 2000), available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/trans/tr150900.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review).  See Interview with Michael Hartmann, supra note 260 
(noting that the judiciary permitted the extension of the detentions because an 
international prosecutor was attempting to re-open the case).  An international 
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decisions to extend detention expired in November 2000, Zeqiri 
remained in a detention center at the U.S. Army Base.265  In response 
to the Ombudsperson’s request for clarification of the legal basis for 
the prolonged detention, the Director of the Department of Judicial 
Affairs wrote that Executive Order detentions were lawful based on 
the broad mandate of Resolution 1244 which permitted the SRSG to 
take “any measure necessary to ensure public safety and order and 
the proper administration of justice.”266  After nearly two years in 
prison, KFOR released Zeqiri from detention because of the lack of 
evidence against him.267 
Zeqiri’s case underscores the difficult balancing law enforcement 
undertakes in interim administrations.  As ethnic violence against 
minorities raged, the U.N. found itself unable to curb quickly and 
effectively the violence.268  The same human rights groups that were 
critical of detention orders had been pushing the U.N. to take action 
against inter-ethnic violence.269  Mounting criticism encouraged the 
SRSG to take decisive measures, including the creation of Executive 
Order detentions to hold those suspected of ethnic violence while 
                                                          
investigating judge granted the initial petition, but an appeals panel made up of a 
majority of local judges reversed the decision.  Id.  A second attempt to re-open the 
case ultimately was refused in December 2000.  Id 
 265. Amnesty, Afrim Zeqiri, supra note 17 (protesting the continued detention of 
Afrim Zeqiri after the expiration of judicial orders). 
 266. Letter from Fernando Castanon, Director of the Department of Judicial 
Affairs, to Marek Antoni Nowicki, Ombudsperson (Mar. 29, 2001), at 
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/Incoming%20Letters/29%20March%20
concerning%20the%20case%20of%20Afrim%20Zequiri%201.pdf (page one) and 
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/Incoming%20Letters/29%20March%20
concerning%20the%20case%20of%20Afrim%20Zequiri%202.pdf (page two) (on 
file with the American University Law Review). 
 267. Interview with Michael Hartman, supra note 260 (pointing out that there was 
only one eye witness for the prosecution, an ethnic Serb who was not a persuasive 
witness); Court Releases Kosovo Albanian for Lack of Evidence after Two-Year Detention, BBC 
MONITORING INT’L REPORTS, June 17, 2002. 
 268. Amnesty International, Six Months On, Climate of Violence and Fear Flies in the 
Face of U.N. Mission, Dec. 23, 1999 (recognizing the U.N.’s inability to protect the 
human rights of ethnic minorities in the first six months of its mission, at 
http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR701361999?open&of=ENG-YUG 
(on file with the American University Law Review). 
 269. Compare Press Release, Amnesty International, FRY/Kosovo:  End Deliberate 
Attacks on Serb Civilians (Feb. 16, 2001) (calling on the U.N. and KFOR to take 
action against the perpetrators of the Nis Express bus attacks), at 
http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700032001?open&of=ENG-YUG 
(on file with the American University Law Review) and Amnesty International, 
Kosovo:  KFOR Must Act Now to Curb Violence Against Ethnic Minorities, Jan. 13, 2000 
(criticizing KFOR’s inability to prevent the murder of a Slavic Muslim family in 
southern Kosovo despite the presence of more than 42,000 troops in the region), at 
http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR 70003200?open&of=ENG-YUG 
(on file with the American University Law Review), with infra Part IV.D.2.b (noting 
the prolonged detention of those involved in the bus attacks). 
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investigations were pending.270  Initially, the judiciary gave great 
deference to the SRSG by approving extensions of detentions 
orders.271  Yet, when the courts raised concerns over the prolonged 
and unjustified detentions, the SRSG made only perfunctory 
responses.272  He justified continued detentions despite more than 
two years passage and little or no evidence implicating Zeqiri.273 
b. The case of the bus bombing suspects 
At the same time as Zeqiri’s detention, Amnesty International 
reported that the U.N. and KFOR were holding seventy persons 
without clarification of the legal basis for the detentions.274  One of 
the most notable cases was the detention of three Albanian men 
arrested in connection with the bombing of the Nis Express, a shuttle 
service for Kosovar Serbs.275  Although the men were arrested in 
March and a panel of international judges found no grounds for the 
detention, the men remained in UNMIK custody because of 
successive Executive Orders for their detention.276 
In response to protests from the Kosovo judiciary, the 
Ombudsperson’s office and human rights groups, the SRSG 
established a detention review commission to review Executive Order 
detentions.277  However, the SRSG alone appointed the judges for the 
                                                          
 270. See supra notes 260-62. 
 271. See supra note 264. 
 272. See supra note 266. 
 273. See supra note 266. 
 274. See Amnesty, Afrim Zeqiri, supra note 17 (noting Amnesty’s request to the 
SRSG to explain the grounds for detentions); see also Interview with Michael 
Hartmann, UNMIK International Prosecutor Feb. 2000-Jan. 2003 and prosecutor for 
the Zeqiri case (June 2003) (recalling that the U.N. held six persons for executive 
order detentions—Zeqiri, four Nis Bombing Suspects and a suspected assassin of two 
Serb priests). 
 275. Amnesty, Executive Orders, supra note 15 (highlighting the continued 
detentions of the three men in a letter to the SRSG urging him not to use Executive 
Orders to detain criminal suspects); see also 2 Serbs Killed, 5 Injured in Bus Attack, 
UNMIK NEWS, Newsletter No. 27, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/ 
pub/news/nl27.html (last visited July 8, 2002) (on file with the American University 
Law Review). 
 276. Amnesty, Executive Orders, supra note 15; see also Press Release, UNMIK, 
UNMIK/PR/394, Background Note on Zeqiri Detention (Oct. 18, 2000) (justifying 
Zeqiri’s detention by executive order on the basis of the SRSG’s ultimate 
responsibility “for providing a safe and secure environment and maintaining the 
public safety and order in Kosovo” under U.N. Resolution 1244), at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/press/pr394.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 277. UNMIK Regulation 2001/18, On the Establishment of a Detention Review 
Commission for Extra-Judicial Detentions Based on Executive Orders, Aug. 25, 2001 
[hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 2001/18], available at 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg18-01.pdf (on file with the 
American University Law Review). 
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review commission, creating an insular relation.278  When the 
commission reviewed the detention of the Nis Express bombing 
suspects, it found the detention lawful and extended the period of 
pre-trial custody of the suspects for an additional three months.279  
The OSCE, on the other hand, reported that there was never 
sufficient evidence to detain the persons.280 
Although the SRSG has informal checks such as the 
Ombudsperson’s office, the Kosovo judiciary, and the OSCE, these 
bodies do not have the authority to correct the SRSG’s abuses.281  
While the creation of a commission was a commendable effort to 
correct problems arising from unlawful detention, it did not have 
sufficient independence from the SRSG to provide meaningful 
oversight.282  As a result, the possible use of Executive Order 
detentions remains intact, despite condemnation from human rights 
groups and local institutions for the lack of compliance with human 
rights standards.283 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO CORRECT ABUSE OF DETENTION ORDERS 
The use of unlawful detentions supports the idea that increasing 
U.N. accountability is tantamount to effective interim 
administrations.284  While the U.N.’s role in future interim 
                                                          
 278. Id. § 2.1; see Press Release, UNMIK, UNMIK/PR/637, SRSG Establishes 
Detention Review Commission (Sept. 3, 2001) (announcing the SRSG’s intention to 
create a special detention review commission to provide an extra-judicial check on 
administrative actions), at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/press-r/pr637. 
html (on file with the American University Law Review). 
 279. Press Release, UNMIK, UNMIK/PR/649, Detention Review Commission 
Supports Detention of Bus Bombing Suspects (Sept. 21, 2001), at http:// 
www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/press-r/pr649.html (on file with the American 
University Law Review). 
 280. See OSCE, LSMR 4, supra note 256, at 46 (arguing that “the current status of 
the [Nis Express case] proves that there has never been enough evidence against the 
suspects and that the executive intervention was only meant to keep the suspects 
detained while investigators were expected to collect evidence against them”). 
 281. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205, § 4.1 (limiting the 
Ombudsperson’s power to the ability to investigate, to make recommendations, and 
to advise the parties in dispute); UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, § 1(1) 
(recognizing that the SRSG exercises authority over administration of the judiciary); 
OSCE, Decision 305, supra note 231 (delegating to the OSCE capacities of 
monitoring and reporting, but with no mention of any authority over other pillars of 
the U.N. mission in Kosovo). 
 282. See OSCE, LSMR 4, supra note 256, at 45-46 (noting that the SRSG flew in 
specially recruited judges for the commission for merely one day to review Executive 
Order detentions). 
 283. But see OSCE, LSMR 4, supra note 256, at 45 (acknowledging the decrease in 
the number of Executive Order detentions).  Although the number of persons 
detained by the KFOR fluctuated, overall it significantly decreased from 100 persons 
in September 2001 to one person in February 2002.  Id. 
 284. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing the potential problems 
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administrations remains uncertain, the use of Executive Order 
detentions in Kosovo underscores the importance of institutional 
checks.285  The Ombudsperson’s Office, the OSCE and human rights 
groups have attempted to bring light to this issue by providing 
analysis and discourse on human rights standards.286  Unfortunately, 
these institutions do not have the political clout in the interim 
administration to counteract human rights violations beyond their 
role of giving recommendations.287  Since the only check on the SRSG 
is through the Security Council or the Secretary-General, the check is 
an impractical means to hold the SRSG accountable for human rights 
violations that do not rise to a level of egregiousness that sounds 
international alarms.288  Many times, Executive Order detentions do 
not appeal to some of the sensationalist media outlets that focus on 
torture, genocide and rape; however, it is important to remember 
that unlawful detentions take away a person’s freedom to move and 
constitute the ultimate restraint on liberty. 
There are a number of ways in which the U.N. may be able to 
correct for the type of shortcomings exhibited by the practice of 
Executive Order detentions.  First, the U.N. needs to focus on the 
role of the judiciary in interim administrations and the meaningful 
distribution of power to such offices.289  The involvement of a 
judiciary ensures an independent check on the interim 
administration and a de-centralization of power.290  Although this may 
not be possible at the outset of a humanitarian intervention 
mission,291 U.N. personnel must give deference to an independent 
                                                          
encountered when international organizations administer inconsistently espoused 
principles).  See generally Wilde, supra note 1, at 460 (advocating analysis of how to 
make U.N. actors more accountable for their conduct in interim administrations). 
 285. See supra Part IV.D (examining the problems with Executive Order 
detentions).  See generally Amnesty, Criminal Justice, supra note 255 (insisting pre-trial 
detentions remain exclusively a judicial function). 
 286. See supra Part IV.D. 
 287. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of these 
organizations’ ability to check the SRSG). 
 288. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A (noting that peace-keeping violations did not stir 
attention until reports of egregious conduct surfaced). 
 289. See supra note 248 and accompanying text; see also Amnesty, Criminal Justice, 
supra note 255 (condemning administrative detentions for their lack of judicial 
review).  See generally Hansjörg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial 
System:  The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 61-
62 (2001) (prioritizing the development of the judiciary as part of the U.N.’s “first-
phase response” to civil society development). 
 290. Id. 
 291. Wendy Betts, et al., The Post Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and 
the Lessons Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
371, 376-79 (2001) (outlining the challenges in establishing the Kosovo judiciary 
following U.N. intervention). 
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judiciary,292 particularly when such a body determines that the SRSG 
violated international human rights law.293  The SRSG, as any state 
actor, must respect the rule of law as it is interpreted by courts.294  
This may be accomplished through designation in Security Council 
resolutions and increased obligations placed on the SRSG to conform 
to international human rights standards.295  As with any State violating 
human rights norms, if the U.N. wishes to thwart human rights based 
on an exigency justification, it must outline the nature of the 
exigency and the dangers posed to the public.296 
Second, the SRSG could have moved controversial cases into the 
domain of international judges who had been incorporated into the 
local judicial system,297 a common practice in war crimes cases tried 
locally.  The broad U.N. regulation permitted the transfer of cases 
whenever there was fear of ethnic bias.298  The use of this feature, 
which existed at the time of these cases, would allow for continued 
development of the fledging judicial system while balancing the 
exigency concerns of the SRSG.299  Through such action, the SRSG 
                                                          
 292. See Wilde, supra note 1, at 457 (noting that the interpretation of U.N. 
mandates has permitted the actions of international officials to go unchallenged by 
the judiciary). 
 293. See supra Part IV.D.2.b and accompanying text. See generally UNMIK 
Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, at 1.1 (limiting the SRSG’s judicial powers to 
administration of the judiciary).  See also Betts et al., supra note 291, at 387 
(emphasizing the importance of an independent judiciary that upholds human 
rights standards). 
 294. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
 295. See, e.g., U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (designating which human rights 
conventions the Security Council considered applicable to the mission). 
 296. See ICCPR, supra note 154, at art. 4(3) (requiring that States that derogate 
from the ICCPR stipulate the reasons for derogation to the Secretary-General of the 
U.N.); see also United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29, 
State of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) 
(outlining the pre-conditions necessary to designate a state of emergency that 
permits derogation from human rights standard). 
 297. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/6, On the Appointment and Removal from Office of 
International Judges and International Prosecutors (Feb. 15, 2000) [hereinafter UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/6] (establishing the integration of international judges in the 
Kosovo judiciary), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/ 
reg06-00.htm. (on file with the American University Law Review). 
The U.N. had attempted to make a separate war crimes court in Kosovo, but the 
U.N. could not secure funding for the proposal.  Adrian Foreman, New War Crimes 
Court in Kosovo, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
europe/727531.stm (last visited Aug. 30, 2003).  Eventually, the U.N. incorporated 
international judges and prosecutors for cases where ethnic bias was a concern.  See 
supra UNMIK Regulation 2000/6. 
 298. UNMIK Regulation 2000/6, supra note 297. 
 299. See E-mail from Clive Baldwin, formerly of the OSCE Department of Human 
Rights and Rule of Law, in Prishtina, Kosovo, to the author (Mar. 15, 2003) (on file 
with the American University Law Review) (suggesting that the SRSG could have 
used the existing international judges, who had been appointed as part of the Kosovo 
judicial system, to deal with cases where evidence may have been sensitive). 
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would be enabling conformity to international human rights for both 
the U.N. and the defendant.  The U.N. would be subject to the 
requirement of judicial scrutiny,300 and the defendant would have 
been brought before an impartial arbitrator who would not be 
subject to local political whims.301 
Finally, if the SRSG feared the lack of independence from a local 
judiciary, even with international judges, the U.N. should have 
provided for the hybridization of authority rather than complete 
usurpation of judicial involvement.302  Following criticism from several 
watchdog institutions, the SRSG instituted an independent 
commission to evaluate the Executive Order detentions.303  One 
problem with the commission was its lack of independence and 
diversity, which could have been resolved through hybridization in its 
membership.304  To add credibility to the commission, the U.N. could 
have appointed existing international judges working in Kosovo or 
required that appointments be made in consultation with the 
judiciary. The hybridization of the commission to include input from 
the SRSG, as well as the judiciary, increases the likelihood that the 
body would put forth independent opinions.305 
The concepts of redistribution and hybridization of authority are 
ways to create a fair administration and to enforce international 
human rights standards. While acknowledging the need for quick 
action in humanitarian intervention, the current application of 
Executive Orders in Kosovo does not provide sufficient institutional 
                                                          
 300. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 4, ON THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A DETENTION REVIEW COMMISSION FOR EXTRA-JUDICIAL DETENTION 
BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDERS ¶ 25  (Aug. 25, 2001) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON, 
SPECIAL REPORT NO. 4] (suggesting that the lack of judicial oversight of Executive 
Order detentions creates an inherent conflict with ECHR), at http://www. 
ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/spec%20reps/pdf/sr4.pdf (on file with the American 
University Law Review). The Report went on to recommend that panels with 
international judges be formed to review the practice of executive order detentions 
to suggest means by which they may comply with international standards.  Id. ¶ 27. 
 301. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 222 (recognizing that everyone has the right to a fair 
trial before an independent and impartial tribunal). 
 302. Interestingly, the SRSG extended the detention of the Nis bombers through 
the time of local elections, in which many western nations wanted Serb participation.  
These extended detentions were allowed to lapse quietly following the elections. 
 303. See supra Part IV.D.2.b (outlining the institution of the Detention Review 
Commission). 
 304. See UNMIK Regulation 2001/18, supra note 277 (authorizing that the SRSG 
alone select the judges for the detention review commission). 
 305. See, e.g., OSCE, LSMR 2, supra note 13 (recommending the incorporation of 
international judges to improve the application of human rights standards). See 
OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 4, supra note 300 (recognizing the importance 
of judicial review in the detention process). 
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checks.306  Current regulations permit up to six months of 
detention,307 which arguably already violates international human 
rights norms as embodied in the ECHR, the ICCPR and the UDHR.308 
Since instruments like the ECHR emphasize the need for judicial 
authorization in detentions, the extra-judicial authorization of 
prolonged detentions violates concepts of hybridization and 
redistribution of authority.309  Judicial involvement in these processes 
would serve to legitimize the executive’s action and to provide a 
needed check in an interim administration.310  Measures such as 
these, though requiring some additional time, are ways to increase 
conformity to international human rights standards to which even 
international organizations should be held.311 
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO THE U.N. 
By advancing a more powerful role to the judiciary through 
hybridization and redistribution of authority, the U.N. may be able to 
curb the unchecked abuses of its personnel.312  In such a system, 
adoption and enforcement of a function-based approach to human 
rights obligations may provide the legal basis for U.N. 
accountability.313  This approach has several important practical 
implications for the operation of the U.N.  First, application of 
human rights to the U.N. will mean a rethinking of the concept of 
privileges and immunities within missions.314  The broad 
authorization of immunities is unworkable as it provides little or no 
means to bring claims against those acting in an administrative 
                                                          
 306. Amnesty, Criminal Justice, supra note 255. 
 307. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/26, supra note 262 (permitting up to an 
additional six months of administrative ordered detentions for pre-trial custodial 
arrests). 
 308. See OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, supra note 14 (discussing the 
findings of the Ombudsperson that certain Executive Orders issued by the SRSG 
resulted in deprivations of liberty and are inconsistent with recognized international 
standards). 
 309. See ECHR, supra note 164, art. 6(1) (“[e]veryone arrested or detained . . . 
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to 
exercise judicial power.”). 
 310. See OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, supra note 14 (noting the need for 
judicial checks on Executive Orders). 
 311. See Bongiorno, supra note 1 (arguing for the application of human rights law 
to the U.N. in East Timor in response to the existing “culture” of impunity). 
 312. See supra Part IV (discussing the U.N. Mission in Kosovo and abuses by the 
U.N. and KFOR of privileges and immunities). 
 313. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 314. See Rawski, supra note 1, at 132 (advocating that privileges and immunities be 
aligned with human rights standards in order to increase the integrity of future U.N. 
governance operations). 
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capacity.315  When combined with the lack of meaningful institutional 
checks, victims of human rights violations are completely left without 
recourse.316  The grant of privileges and immunities, while necessary, 
must be tailored in a manner to compensate those harmed in the 
implementation of administrative policy.317 
Second, the adoption of a function-based model creates the 
obvious question of when and what human rights standards are 
applicable, as missions vary significantly in mandate.318  One solution 
would be to have the U.N. articulate which conventions should 
apply.319  In creating mission mandates, the Security Council could 
enumerate the applicable human rights standards.320  However, as 
history demonstrates, self-monitoring can be problematic because the 
U.N. is not always forthcoming in applying standards to itself.321  
Alternatively, the U.N. may evoke the laws applicable to a territory 
based on the conventions to which the State has already become a 
signatory.322  As such, the rights would be a continuation of the duties 
of the previous State.323  However, problems may arise in this context 
because some states will not have consented to some conventions,324 
and the U.N. will still be monitoring itself in continuing the State’s 
duties.325 
Finally, the creation of U.N. accountability raises the more global 
issue of enforcement.  Applying human rights law to the U.N. 
                                                          
 315. See supra Part II.A (relating the abuse of privileges and immunities by the 
U.N. and KFOR). 
 316. See Amnesty, No Impunity, supra note 250 (describing the events surrounding 
the alleged torture and ill-treatment of an Albanian detainee by a member of the 
U.N. Civilian Police). 
 317. See Rawski, supra note 1, at 104-05 (arguing that while immunity protections 
are necessary to shield the U.N. and its personnel, particularly in unstable political 
environments where regular institutions of law and order are inoperable, such 
immunities must be reconciled with basic human rights). 
 318. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, supra note 9 (enumerating the human rights 
standards applicable to public officials in Kosovo acting in an official capacity); see 
also U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (authorizing the U.N. Mission in East Timor 
and specifying that public officials must observe the internationally recognized 
human rights standards established in instruments such as the UDHR and the 
ICCPR). 
 319. See U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5. 
 320. Id. 
 321. See supra Part III (discussing the U.N.’s belated adoption of humanitarian law 
to peace-keeping operations). 
 322. See, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, supra note 9, § 1 (providing that the 
applicable law in Kosovo shall include the regulations promulgated by the SRSG as 
well as the law that was in force in Kosovo on Mar. 22, 1989). 
 323. Id. 
 324. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205 (applying in Kosovo the 
rights established in the ECHR, despite the fact that Yugoslavia, to which Kosovo still 
belonged, was not a signatory to the agreement). 
 325. See infra notes 326-30. 
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inherently creates liabilities for the Organization,326 and the U.N. may 
thus be fiscally accountable for the actions of its personnel.327  It is 
clear that self-monitoring is unlikely.  As suggested by the 
Ombudsperson for UNMIK, the U.N. should create an independent 
commission to adjudicate claims against the Organization.328  In 
addition to being valuable for a broadly-mandated mission, such as 
the case in Kosovo, this type of institution would be valuable for the 
entire U.N. system.329  The presence of a claims commission accessible 
at the location of a mission with administrators who are not part of 
the mission would facilitate compensation of victims.  Furthermore, it 
would provide a means of identifying institutional problems at an 
earlier stage during a mission, thus providing more possibilities for 
correcting abuses.330  If such an institution existed in Kosovo, it would 
serve both as a deterrent against the SRSG in sidestepping 
international human rights law and the mandate of the mission, and 
as a means for victims to receive just compensation for grievances. 
CONCLUSION 
The U.N., as the harbinger of human rights standards, should be 
held accountable as it continues to undertake obligations 
traditionally falling under the domain of the State.  While the 
presence of exigent circumstances may be a legitimate reason for 
centralizing authority, the rationale wears thin as three years pass in a 
mission and no mechanisms for accountability are set in place.  As 
the U.N. is a facilitator in the development of the entire body of 
international human rights law, it is only appropriate that it model 
the means through which to achieve good governance.  
Accountability is of fundamental importance in the success of a U.N. 
mission and the successful transition of authority to local actors.  
Consequently, the U.N. must provide the example to which local 
actors can aspire through the application and enforcement of human 
rights standards in its missions. 
                                                          
 326. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, supra note 12 (providing recourse for third 
parties suffering injuries through Claims Commissions established by KFOR and 
UNMIK). 
 327. Id. 
 328. See OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1, supra note 108, at 19 
(recommending the establishment of the claims commission envisioned in Section 7 
of UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, one that would provide individuals with access to an 
independent and impartial tribunal that would protect their guaranteed civil rights). 
 329. Id. 
 330. See, e.g., supra Part IV (discussing the Ombudsperson’s contribution as an 
institutional check). 
